Newsletter 2015/1
At the beginning of the fourth year after the start of the revolution in Yemen in 2011 it is time to draw an interim balance of the outcome of the aspirations for, and visions of, a better life for the Yemeni population. What has been achieved, what has gone wrong, what remains to be done?
A general remark: western countries very often blame the countries of the “Arab Spring” for having failed to reach the revolutionary goal since they could not achieve the political transition from dictatorship and cleptocracy towards a democratic state in the course of three years. Before passing such judgment consideration should be given to the time European states needed to turn absolutistic states into democracies.
In comparison, Yemen has achieved incredibly much in the past three years. Taking into account the size of this country, the exploding population (50 % of inhabitants are under 15 ), a very minor exploitation of resources for the benefit of the population, a neglected infrastructure, international discrimination as “villain state”, an extremely centralized and cleptocratic government satisfying almost exclusively particular interests, ubiquitary corruption, tribes and whole provinces drifting apart, rebellions at the frontiers, lack of a Yemeni identity or national conscience, and growing poverty it would appear almost impossible to achieve a peaceful transition.
To aggravate the situation, the former ruling class, having exploited the country for 30 years and amassed wealth, insist on remaining in power with all available and almost unlimited means still at their disposal, and refuse to return wrongfully obtained property.
In addition, during the three years Yemen has become the object of geostrategic interests in the region and also globally: disintegrating administrations and economic interests of the superpowers influence the country in many ways. While some promote a consolidation of the new Yemen other interventionists wish to fuel sectarian conflicts and endeavour to further destabilize the country.
An impressively positive result was brought about by Jamal Benomar, the UN special envoy, who not only settled numerous internal conflicts in Yemen, but also put an end to the image of Yemen as a “villain state”, and instead made sure to have it represented as a model development country on the global political scene, thus helping to avoid – to a considerable extent –- subversive activities and a drifting into the permanently looming danger of civil war.
What has been achieved? Above all the new design of political structures has considerably progressed. The National Dialogue created the basis for the future constitutional democracy: 565 representatives of the very different social groups from all provinces accomplished the foundation for a democratic co-operation. A committee drafted a new constitution which was handed over to President Hadi a short time ago. The draft also contains a new, but not uncontested political structure of the administration. The new structure provides for a replacement of the centralist government for 21 powerless provinces by a federal structure of six relatively autonomous regions. It is the bone of contention of the Houthis who are afraid of a pending unbalanced distribution of power. The GCC Roadmap, established in 2012, and cementing the old distribution of power, and excluding the Houthis who stem from the marginalised north of the country, the “southern provinces” with Haraka, and civil societies from political participation, was superseded by a “Peace and Partnership Agreement”, signed by all fractions on September 9th, 2014, and guaranteeing a participation of all powers, while at the same time reducing the influence of the “old elite”. One more advantage: Since November 2014 Yemen has a new government with Khaled Mahfud Bahah as prime minister, and the new ministers not appointed according to party political criteria but being a handpicked group of experts.
The gigantic target of this new government is dominated by the two weakest factors in the present situation: Security and economic development.
Despite various attempts at reforming the army and the security forces there is so far no way of guaranteeing security for the population. Last year 1.700 Yemenis lost their lives in brutal, politically motivated conflicts, more than ever before since the revolution. Armed conflicts between the Houthis (who so far “took over” eight provinces) and alQaida, partially supported by Sunnite tribes, have caused the same death toll as alQaida`s disastrous attacks against the security forces and civilians. Although sectarian conflicts between Sunnites and Zaidis are fomented they find little fertile soil in some provinces.
The economy, increasingly deteriorating since the start of the Century, has reached bedrock and financially Yemen depends to an ever increasing extent on “friends”, sponsors and banks, further limiting her political independence. Meeting basic needs of the population (with the help of the UNO and various Development Aid Organizations) and creating a climate and structures favouring economic activity and investments, in turn demanding improved security, are thus priority tasks for the new government.However, there is every reason to be optimistic since Yemenis are extraordinary people.
Much remains to be done. More information on further developments will be offered monthly on this homepage. If you would like to receive this newsletter by E-Mail please register.