Kämpfen um die Vormacht im Jemen (von links): iranischer Präsident Hassan Rohani, Houthi-Führer Abdelmalik alHouthi, Expräsident Ali Abdullah Saleh, Präsident Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi, Präsident der Emirate Mohamed bin Zayed, saudischer König Salman bin Abdelaziz

On 17th February 2017, the UN published the “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen”, for which a panel of experts had investigated and described the impact of UNSR resolutions 2140 and 2216 on 242 pages. The direct reference to UNSR resolutions, representing the interests of the Saudi coalition and the so-called legitimate government in 2014 and 2015, explain a certain unilateral aspect of the reports, unilateral since only the weapon supplies from Iran to the Houthis but not those of the Gulf countries, the USA und GB for Hadi, alQaida and Salafistic militia were questioned, only the sanctions of Saleh and his son and also the al-Houthi leadership were investigated but not the financial transactions of Hadi and his clans. Nevertheless, the report offers new insight and conclusions, above all by describing, relatively unbiased, violations of martial law, acts against humanity and human rights committed by all parties. The most important items of the report in a short summary read :

• All countries involved in the war and also Hadi´s government are responsible for war crimes and violations of human rights committed. This is of special importance since e.g. Saudi Arabia conjures up excuses for the attack at the funeral celebration in Sana´a with 150 killed and 600 wounded, attributing this to the failure of one individual. The allocation of blame also includes the „collateral damage“ suffered by the civilian population during US drone attacks:
  “All States whose forces engage in or otherwise participate in military operations on behalf of the coalition are responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. These States may not evade their obligations by placing their contingents at the disposal of an ad hoc coalition. All coalition member States and their allies also have an obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure respect for international humanitarian law by the coalition. This obligation is especially incumbent upon the Government of Yemen, upon whose request and with whose consent the air strikes are being conducted.”
  This will please the governments of Morocco and Egypt having withdrawn from the air raids in good time. Hadi will, in all probability, have to stand trial at the International Court in The Hague.
• The air raids of the Saudi coalition have devastated the Yemeni infrastructure and terrorised the population but failed to bend the will of the Houthi-Saleh-Alliance to continue the war.
• The Houthi-Saleh attacks at ships navigating in the Red Sea have increased the risk of a regional extension of the conflict. The Houthi-Saleh-Alliance has shown considerable fitness for action in maritime war.
• The transfer and smuggling of weapons by sea from Iran to the Houthis has so far not been clearly provable. Several incidents of weapon supplies on vessels departing from Iranian harbours in the Gulf have been investigated  but – on the basis of the routes chosen and the telephone conversations monitored –  it looks pretty obvious that the vessels were destined for Somalia. Evidence that Iranian weapons had been brought from there to Yemen could not be found. The alleged weapon transfer from Iran to the Houthis had initially been massively postulated by Israel, followed by the permanent publication of alarm announcements. Saudi Arabia keeps making use of these “fake news” in order to justify the war against Yemen and the embargo of supplies of vital resources for the population.
• The transfer of the Yemeni central bank to Aden by Hadi´s government has opened an effective „economic front“ in this war and considerably curtailed the economic capacities of the Houthi-Saleh-Alliance in the military continuation of the conflict  and also the administration of the areas under their control. Simultaneously, the vital resources for the population have become so very scarce that the humanitarian disaster accelerates.

The report also refers to the activities of the so-called Hizam-associations, installed by the Emirates as their own security troops in “freed Yemen” and active in four provinces. Complaints about abuse, intimidation, arrest and partly also torture keep increasing on the part of the population. This refers in particular to the so-called “Hadrami Elite troops”, supposedly representing an anti-terror unit and carrying out torture in routine manner in secret prisons. The report gives the following wording:

“The Panel finds that, even if these individuals were associated with AQAP, the Government is obliged under international humanitarian law and international human rights law to ensure that the Hadrami Elite Forces, or any other forces operating on the ground under the authority and/or control and/or with the consent of the Government, comply with relevant legal requirements and procedural safeguards regarding deprivation of liberty … Given that the United Arab Emirates also has ground forces operating in Mukalla, their government has similar obligations. The United Arab Emirates have informed the Panel that the coalition has provided “military, financial and training assistance” and “intelligence, logistic information and aerial intervention” to the Hadrami Elite Forces, which are under the control of the legitimate Yemeni Armed Forces.”

The Emirates have been considered responsible also for crimes and violations of rights by the Hizam troops even if the Hizam forces proforma  operate under the name of Yemeni government forces. In actual fact the Hadi regime has no control over the Hizam troops.

Quite interesting is also the minutely detailed report about attempts of Khaled Ali Saleh, one of Ali Abdullah Saleh´s son and  Ahmed Ali Saleh´s brother to circumvent the sanctions imposed upon them, in particular the freezing of accounts, and launder  money. The panel has tracked the itinerary of the accounts (totalling three-digital US million amounts) in six banks in six countries. No money transfer abroad could be verified as regards the sanctioned Houthi-leaders.

• The present sphere of influence of Ali Abdullah Saleh has been carefully scrutinized and leads towards the conclusion that he has remained quite powerful, to be explained by the networks he established during his 30 years as president, in particular among the tribes, with the militia and in his party Moutamar. His close and stable connexions with the usually not consistently loyal tribes were strengthened and stabilized by means of a clever marriage policy pursued with his multiple daughters and sons.
• Furthermore, by using the example of 10-12 proven violations, the report minutely describes the war crimes against the civilian population on both sides. The selected cases have been proven by documentary material although the Panel had not been permitted a research in situ.

The complete pdf UN Report is attached.

The military situation has changed very little in the course of the past months in Yemen, but armed disputes have become less frequent with the exception of some unyielding front lines. The Saudi air forces, however,  continued attacking the country from North Yemen to South Taiz with cluster bombs and other weapons, but with less frequency, while alQaida has become most active, defending their retreat areas in alBeidha, Schabwa and Abyan against the Houthi/Saleh-troops und and struggling for survival with  the Hizam-Brigades in the South.

Peace negotiations are chanceless at the time being with a view to the prerequisites and conditions of the “International Community” (consisting of the US, the UK, the KSA und the VAE), and keep being postponed. Never the less, the course for the post war alignment is being set in the different parts of the country, showing a drifting apart of the latter. The changes are most obvious in bigger towns where the new peacekeeping powers endeavour to get consolidated.

Aden

18 months after the end of war activities the infrastructure has become almost fully operational again in Aden, although power cuts are daily fare. The modern diesel generators supplied by the Emirates have to be switched off temporarily because of a lack of fuel. Waste disposal and the sewage system have improved too. The ever and again announced reopening of the airport has taken effect to a limited extent only: a newly established private “Queen Bilqis Airline” is to connect Aden and Mukalla-Ryan with  international destinations. The flamboyant announcement of a reinstallation of the port has become a very slow process indeed. Aden University has been active with the exception of three months in the spring of 2015 but has been subjected to new legal prerequisites and curricula as well as requirements for mainstream studies and appointments. The courts, the security organs and the public administration still do not function.

Image: The new diesel generators supplied by the Emirates are temporarily out of order because of a lack of fuel

Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi has been residing at the presidential palace Maschiq in Aden-Tawahi since the end of November but for security reasons is going out only sporadically, some time ago for a one-week visit to Mukalla. Critics are worried Hadi might be selling off Yemeni resources and interests in order to finance his regime.

At the end of December – in the wake of the transfer of the central bank from Sana´a to Aden – the military personnel received their pay for the first time after three months which somehow calmed the situation. According to Hadi Aden was to become a model city as  the “provisional capital“, a so far pitifully unsuccessful attempt, above all because of the unstable and insecure situation. The car bomb attacks Daash employs for advertising and recruiting, periodically kill and wound above all masses of young recruits. At times up to 18 armed groups and militia have been acting, bringing about an escalation of the chaos and bewilderment of the population. Various militia carry out checks at every 100 metres, demarcating ”their“ territories in arms.

Image: Daash tries to recruit by means of this photo of a young suicide bomber (with an explosive belt) who killed 40 soldiers and injured 50 in Aden on 19/12/ 2016

Numerous Adanis have demonstrated against the shortcomings, burnt tires in the streets and erected blockades to protest against the lack of fuel, the power cut offs, the lack of public services and the insecure situation. This has given new impetus to the Secessionists.

Hadi is now trying to obtain supremacy over the militia or eliminate it. The most important representatives are the so-called “Hizam-Brigades” (security belt brigades), associations in the Southern provinces established and financed by the Emirates (possibly also by the KSA and Qatar). The so far approx.15.000 security forces of “Hizam” have been recruited in South Yemen and trained by Emirati officers above all in combatting terror in four provinces, and are said to be selectively launched against alQaida and Daash, which in turn has made them become a target of the two terror organizations. AlQaida is progressing at the expense of Daash, possibly because it succeeds in mobilising resistance against the „occupation forces“ and engages in mortal fights against military opponents, political leaders and the cleric. The Hizam high commands, on the other hand, allegedly consist of fundamentalist Salafists. The Hizam have not endeared themselves so far to the Adani population because of acting in a harshly molesting style, and have so far not been following Hadi´s command,  but have been financed by the occupation forces direct and are therefore heteronomous. They threaten the population and have their own prisons. The tensions between Hadi and Hizam associations point towards tensions between Hadi and the Emirates, who apparently support him only since they need a legal entity for legally binding involvements in the South.

Marib

The governor of the central province of Marib with important oil and gas deposits is Sultan alArada, who is a follower of Hadi´s and has been cooperating with the Saudi occupation forces. The majority of the tribes, representing the mightiest social power in Marib, is assumed to support the Salafist alArada. Marib was the first stronghold of the Saudi ground invasion in May 2015. At the very beginning suffering from a heavy setback by a rocket attack, Saudi troops no longer take part in battles on the ground

since then. Although foreign militia are present in Marib and also in the Southern provinces, primarily from the Emirates, Saudi Arabia and the USA but entrench themselves for security reasons in barracks and army camps. Battles have been going on for a year without any major displacements of the frontlines only in the mountainous Western part of the province at the border to the vicinity of Sana´a, above all in the former Sabaean metropolis of Sirwah and in Nehm. The provincial capital Marib has become a tribally coined small town with approx. 30.000 inhabitants, but appears to be earmarked for an important future in line with the steadily rising  construction activities observed. New houses keep being erected. The building owners are mostly new arrivals from the areas occupied by the Houthis, and increasingly represent proponents of the Islah-Party, adherents of the Salafists, the Muslim brothers, tribal sheikhs and North Yemenis from Hadi´s circles, but also proponents of Moutamar who broke away from  Saleh´s Moutamar, followed Hadi into exile and have chosen Marib as their new location. They come from Amran, Sana´a, Dhamar und other towns in the North, currently ruled by the Houthis and Moutamar. These internally displaced persons, many of whom have been temporarily outside the country, obviously no longer expect a possible return to Sana´a or other towns on the North in a foreseeable future. No longer considering a return possible even in the longer term and expecting Marib to become the capital of the the Saba region they hope that the federal structure as concluded in the  National Dialogue conference in 2013/14 will come true so that Marib will be the capital of the region with the provinces of Marib, alJawf and alBeidha. Property prices are already soaring in Marib.  

Taiz

Some observers compare the situation in Taiz with that in Aleppo. Ferocious battles have been going on since the beginning of the war at the end of March 2015. The situation might well be attributed to an irony of fate that the most liberal, richest and freest city in Yemen should have become the scene of fierce and partly also sectarian battles. The core of Taiz is supported by a resistance movement endeavouring to hold the city, situated in a hollow, by all means, in particular artillery, under the command of Hamud alMikhlafi. The resistance in the city of Taiz, now characterized by Salafists, does certainly not represent the basic ideology of the majority of the population who only desires peace. The Houthi and Saleh associations lay siege to the city from the mountains around with heavy weaponry. After 20 months of war parts of the city are as destroyed as Aleppo. Moreover, airplanes of the Saudi coalition often drop bombs over the city and the vicinity. Both war parties, in particular the  beleaguerers, have committed human rights violations. Many of the more than half a million inhabitants have deserted the embattled eastern parts of the city. The circumvallation around the city has caused a severe shortage of supplies of food and medicines. Merchandise is smuggled into the city on donkey paths and cost a fortune.

Yemeni fighters loyal to Yemen’s exiled President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi, drive a tank during clashes with Shiite Huthi rebels in the country’s third-city of Taez on December 19, 2016. / AFP PHOTO / Ahmad AL-BASHA

Members of the “Volkswiderstand“ Salafistic Militia, disliked by most of the population, in extensively destroyed Taiz

“Shooting and looting” is the tactic of the militia in “liberated” Taiz, where hate between fundamentalist Sunnis and Zeidis keeps dangerously growing because of the armed escalation and the misery of the population. Deserted houses are immediately plundered by Salafistic militia, inhabitants abducted and missing for weeks. Complaints also refer to militia opening house doors by shooting upon having occupied a street and ransacking the house. No area, no town in Yemen – with the exception of Saada – has been as brutally stricken as Taiz. Especially the middle classes suffer most in this war: houses are destroyed and plundered, many schools are closed, public servants have not been paid their salaries for months, many are out of work and have to spend their savings or sell property to survive. Refrigerators,  TV sets, washing machines and furniture of all kind are offered on the market in Taiz at half their value. Many people feel terrorized by both sides of the front. A worn out Taizi complains:

“I cannot trust either the Houthis nor the resistance to control my city as both of them do not care about the civilians”. Plundering is also experienced in the areas occupied by the Houthis around Taiz.

However, the situation in zones controlled by the Houthis is essentially more favourable since the police, schools, hospitals and courts function as compared to the areas occupied by the militia. Sometimes also alQaida-warriors have joined the “muqawama schabia” (people´s resistance) in fighting  the Houthi occupation, but this is said to be no longer the case. Never the less, it is a fact that the militia rather destroy what order had remained and spread anarchy, thus creating an ideal climate for the terror organizations.

On October 3rd 2016, Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed, the UN special delegate for Yemen, speaking at the UN Security Council, brought forward his opinion of the present situation. He had to admit the unsuccessfulness of his recent endeavours since the three-day ceasefire could not be extended while the violence of assaults has been further increasing.  Both the Houthis-Saleh-Fraction in Sana´a and the exiled government in Ryadh rejected Sheikh Ahmed´s roadmap.

His strategy had envisaged the setting up of a military and a security council to supervise the planned steps such as the retreat of the Houthi/Saleh (=Ansarallah/Moutamar) from the towns Sana´a, Taizz and Hodeidah (to go where?) and the handing over of weapons (to whom?). Both bodies would, furthermore, have been charged with ensuring the final ending of military disputes and the security of the population and of public institutions.

The roadmap, in parallel, provides for political measures such as the nomination of a Vice-president (who is to nominate him on the basis of which criteria?) and the formation of a unity government to arrange for the transition process and the renewal of the political dialogue, followed by a final draft of a constitution and, finally, elections.

Sheikh Ahmed explains the failure of his roadmap because:

“the political elite in Yemen remains unable to overcome their differences and prioritize national, public interest over personal interests. It is time for the parties to realize that there can be no peace without concessions, and no security without agreement. They should base their positions on the question of how to ensure security and stability for the Yemeni people.”

This allocation of blame on the Yemeni elite is certainly correct but disregards the fact that the kind of action adopted by the UN between conflict partners is totally asymmetric and biased, ignoring the difference between the Yemeni conflict partners and the belligerent nations, who are not identical.

• Only the representatives of the elite are taking part at the UN negotiating table, anxious to retain their power, but not the different representatives of the South, new political parties, groups of civilians, women, minorities, regionals associations of interest – i.e. all those eager to make a peace agreement come true. The negotiations as undertaken by the UN accelerate the battle for power on the part of the elite, thus prolonging their aspirations to retain power.
• The war goes on in and around alJauf, Marib, alBeidha, Lahij, Taizz, at the coast of the Red Sea and on Saudi territory. The belligerent parties, quite in a position to bring about a ceasefire, have ceased negotiating.
• On the Yemeni side this refers to the armed followers of the Houthi and the Saleh-loyal military units, having conquered a huge part of the former North Yemen. They constitute a relatively clearly marked military unit, supported by local militia and tribes.
• The wartime enemy is Saudi Arabia, with the support of the USA, Great Britain and the rest of the coalition leading a permanent and only sporadically interrupted air war since 26th March, 2015, against the area conquered by the Houthi/Saleh. On the ground support is given by a faltering and decreasing number of various units of mercenaries, local militia of the Salafis, the secessionists, resistance groups with very different motivations and, increasingly, also alQaida. The exiled president Hadi, while fully dependent on his host Saudi Arabia, with no military or political backing, neither in the North nor in the South, proclaims legitimately representing the interests of the Yemen and the Yemeni. He is not even ready to share political power with a vice president, but insists on exerting power as “internationally acknowledged President.”
• Saudi Arabia, the USA, the Emirates and Great Britain, the parties engaged in this war, meet , partly also with other „friends“ of Yemen, at summits where it is pronounced that the war must be finished without delay because of the humanitarian situation but apparently are not even prepared to negotiate an end of air raids. The USA und GB increasingly attempt to distance themselves from civilian mass bombing in Yemen because of criticism in their own countries, but Saudi-arabian F 16 cannot carry out flights over Yemen without refuelling by US tanker aircraft. The USA could very well stop the bomb war any time but obviously do not want to.

The Yemen agenda of the UN has entered a dead alley because of the completely asymmetric construction of the negotiation levels, no negotiations between real war opponents, and missing roadmaps, with no hope for a possible way out at the time being, less so since the UN acts under massive pressure and influence of Saudi Arabia. Thus, it will hardly be possible to revise UN Security Council resolution 2216, which cemented the insolvability of the conflict. In addition, the war in Yemen has started, to an increasing extent, to play the role of a deputy or model in a new order of the Middle East.

The military attacks against the civilian population in Yemen have become ever more brutal since the beginning of October. Simultaneously, the danger of this war taking regional dimensions and even leading to international conflicts increases, in particular as regards the shipping traffic in the Red Sea.

On October 1st  the Houthi/Saleh-units bombed a military vessel of the UAE from the South coast of the Red Sea and caused heavy damage. On October 8th the Saudi – with US support – bombed a funeral ceremony in the centre of Sana´a. The target had obviously been Ali Abdullah Saleh (who supposedly should have been eliminated to compensate Hadi´s loss of power, but did not attend), and also the leadership ranks of the Moutamar and the Houthis. More than 150 persons, primarily the Houthi and Moutamar elite, died in this one-two punch, more than 500 were injured. The US-destroyer USS Masson subsequently claimed having been attacked three times by bullets from the Yemeni Western coast and, retaliating, devastated three radar installations of the Houthi/Saleh. Obviously with a view to avoiding an international escalation in the Red Sea the USA withdrew the accusation that the bullets had been Houthi-Saleh weaponry. It was no longer known where from and whether the bullets had been fired at all at the US-Masson. The so far latest event was a Scud-Rocket attack of the Houthis towards Mekka-Jeddah. The Houthis maintain they wanted to hit the military airport in Jeddah, where from bomb flights to Yemen start. Saudi media claim, however, the rocket attack which they allegedly fought off, had been directed at the Kaaba in Mekka and used this claim to fuel massive anti-Shia propaganda in Sunni countries.

Meanwhile the humanitarian situation keeps pitifully deteriorating and is dramatically aggravated by measures ordered by Hadi, such as the transfer of the Yemeni Central Bank to Aden (where it was immediately raided). The publicly employed staff representing a major part of employees have not been paid their salaries for two months, cholera is spreading, the number of extremely malnourished children and grown-ups keeps steadily increasing. More than three million people have become refugees inside the country.

Statistical data of the bomb war

A recently published, independent and unbiased investigation rendered horrific results in respect of victims and damage of the bomb war brought about by the Saudi alliance, not to be attributed to the military sector but concerning civilians and the civil infrastructure. This investigation, based on open-source information and in situ inspection, confirmed that more than 8.600 airstrikes were flown by the Saudi coalition between end of March 2015, the commencement of the bomb war, and end of August 2016.  3.577 thereof hit military plants and 3.158 non-military targets. In 1.882 cases it was not possible to ascertain whether the targets had been military or civilian.

The number of victims during this period has been quoted as exceeding 10.000, with more than 3.799 civilian victims. Human Rights Organisations repeatedly documented violations on the part of the Houthis, in particular the use of landmines and the indiscriminate shelling of living quarters, and have disclosed that the Yemeni population has been suffering from severe injuries committed by all sides, and continues to be attacked.

The Yemen Data Project covers exclusively the investigation of airstrikes and their consequences and refrained from a survey of victims in ground battles since reliable and complete evidence cannot be obtained as access to front lines is denied.

In the investigation carried out insight was gained that above all the repeated attacks on unmistakably civilian targets cannot be justified. Collateral damage might be explained by erroneous controlling or wrong logistics, or – in densely populated areas such as in Sana´a – by proximity to military targets, but the repeated bombing of schools and hospitals does not allow such a justification and requires more precise examinations.

The map of the air raids of the Saudi Alliance registered shows that above all the tribal region of the Houthis in the North, in Sana´a and environment and Taizz, and, until July 2015, Aden were most afflicted. 942 attacks hit residential areas, 114 markets, 34 Mosques, 147 schools, 46 universities and 378 transport routes or vehicles.

Opposition against the participation of their respective governments in this bomb war has started seething for quite some time in Great Britain and the US. Parliamentary opposition against approved supplies of arms, in particular of bombs to Saudi Arabia, has recently increased too.

Tribal gathering in Arhab

Armed disputes on Yemeni territory are, at the time being, concentrated in areas north and east of Sana´a and Taizz. A tribal gathering has been convened in the fought-over area of Arhab for the purpose of obtaining the loyalty of the tribal fighters for the “national” victory and against the hostile “Saudi invaders”. The tribal fighters are rewarded with food contingents and cash and are not considered as mercenaries or legionaries in the context of this agreement but as professional warriors under certain conditions committing themselves publicly to a matter.

The Houthis collect cash from the population in order to finance the pay for the tribal fighters, contributions more or less voluntarily given. Cash is increasingly in short supply in Yemen since Saudi Arabia attempts, having called in the exiled president Hadi, after destroying the infrastructure, besieging and starving out the population, eventually also to paralyse the central bank in order to bring whatever economic activity for millions of people to a standstill.

An exiled government and “liberated” areas

In the course of the past days, exiled president Hadi, speaking from Ryadh, instructed the members of his government, to engage efficiently in the reconstruction and improvement of living conditions in the “liberated” areas. This meets with surprise in the country: “where are the “liberated” areas”? And where is the government to implement this?  Except for two flying visits of a few hours Hadi has not been in Yemen for 19 months, his prime minister bin Daghr had made fabulous announcements for some days running in Aden but there has been no follow up. For 13 months after the end of the armed disputes the population in Aden has been severely suffering from the destroyed infrastructure, insufficient security and supply shortages.

And yet: There is hope!

Latest photos sent from the coffee mountains in the province of Raimah are evidence that the ancient „biblical“ Yemen, FELIX ARABIA, is still alive.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/yemenis-living-in-the-mountaintops_us_57d80d43e4b0fbd4b7bb6aa2

http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/09/far-from-the-war-yemens-remote-mountain-villages/500585/

The negotiations having taken place with interruptions in Kuwait since April 10th to obtain a ceasefire in Yemen met with a new negative climax when a resolution drafted by OSEGY Ismael Ould Sheikh Ahmed at the UN Security Council was opposed by Russia.

Great Britain, represented by Peter Wilson, the deputy UN ambassador, had prepared a blueprint for the meeting of the UN Security Council, acting as patron of the discussions and having nominated Sheikh Ahmed as special envoy, on August 3rd in New York. As in all former resolutions  the text figured Saudi Arabia again as war party  and unduly favoured the Saudi-sponsored Hadi government “as internationally recognized“, thereby manoeuvring the Houthi-Saleh fractions into a realistically not valid position of a defeated and surrendering party.

After the break-up of the meeting Vitaly Churkin, Russia´s delegate in the Security Council, stated that “the council was almost ready to make a joint pronouncement in support of the political process” when a delegation made an unacceptable demand”. The countries setting unacceptable conditions once again were Great Britain and the USA, advocating in all previous resolutions and above all in the ill-fated Resolution 2216 a pro-Saudi position, obliging the Houthi-Saleh fractions to surrender and pull back from conquered towns before the start of whatever negotiations. The preconditions stipulated in this Resolution render a genuine peace agreement impossible since they permit the Hadi fraction, without making any further move, to insist uncompromisingly on compliance with Resolution 2216, which is unacceptable for the Houthi –Saleh fraction, and permit the Saudi belligerent party to continue bombarding Yemen, allowing for the death of many more children and, simultaneously, starve out the Yemeni population by blocking ports and airports.

The latest attempt of accusing the Houthis and Saleh for the failure of the negotiations was based on the setting up of a political council by the latter on July 28th, in Sana´a, judged as “unilateral procedure” not in line with relevant conditions. Great Britain and undisclosed other members of the Security Council (with Saudi Arabia in the background) intended to punish the Houthis for having revalued Saleh with this political council and reinstalled him in a public position.

The Houthis/Ansar Allah and the (remaining) Moutamar/Ali Abdullah Saleh had set up a political council of 10 persons (five per fraction) with alternating chairmanship in Sana´a on July 28^th, to start intensive efforts to solve important problems – in the fields of economy, finances and reconstruction, and eclipse the military agenda. This makes all the more sense since Saudi Arabia is continuing the war with ever more means of economic pressure.

The news that the Houthis/Affash and Saleh/Moutamar announced the establishment of a joint political government with five members each in Sana´a was a bombshell in Yemen. The excitement and anguish is to be explained above all by the presence of Ali Abdullah Saleh, obviously prepared to take over a leading position in this new government, and the approval of this development by the Houthis. Saleh, since 2011 ex-president, in next to no time re-established his former authority with this TV Address. Although numerous proxies and party

Ali Abdullah Saleh in his TV address on July 28th, 2016 in Sana´a

members had left him, had created new parties or sided with Hadi, and the Moutamar has become a sort of mock up party, it is, and has always been the person of Saleh radiating power and monitoring. As a result of Saleh´s high handed performance many of those who had hoped in 2011 that he will be gone for good, now fear his revenge. The oppressive powerlessness of the population vis-à-vis the ruling had been somewhat mitigated by the 2011 revolution but instantly flared up in the light of Saleh´s massive presence.

Above all in the South the population, already severely burdened by the political insecurity, permanently attempted assassinations and an alien government, is irritated by the new rise of the hated centralist Saleh. The tendency towards separation is massively promoted by this development. In addition, Saleh can still count on loyalty within the administration, of tribal sheikhs and the militia.

pro-Houthi and pro-Saleh-Demonstration in Sana´a in pouring rain on July 29th, 2016

In his TV address Saleh primarily confronted Saudi Arabia, denouncing continued war crimes and requesting direct negotiations to obtain a ceasefire.

A big demonstration in pouring rain in Sana´a on July 29th clearly demonstrated how much backing the Houthis and Saleh still enjoy in North Yemen while Hadi still lives in Riyadh as “king without a people and a country” but is considered the “internationally acknowledged president of Yemen “ in faraway New York.

The fact that GB, the USA, France and at the time being also Egypt and Senegal, financially depending on Saudi Arabia, as not permanent members of the Security Council, act in line with this strategy to criticise the Houthis and support Hadi and his Saudi patrons cannot bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict. Since the parties involved are well aware of this fact their attitude must be spelled out as their obvious interest in a continuation of the armed conflict  – but under international supervision. Russia, the somewhat only country having maintained their embassy in Sana´a throughout the war, is increasingly backing the Houthis and opposing the above strategy.

However, despite support granted by the UN, Saudi Arabia cannot comfortably lean back because the advance of the Houthi-Saleh troops is uninterrupted in the South of Saudi territory.

Quite some astonishment caused a Houthi rocket with only 2 km reach reported to have hit the town centre of Samidah in the Saudi province of Jizan, a location at only 10 km air distance from the Yemeni border, evidence for its having been launched 8 km inside Saudi territory.  The advance of Yemeni troops – according to observers consisting half of Houthis and half of Saleh-loyal militia – extends over 200 km along the common border.

The negotiations held in Kuwait for the purpose of a peace settlement in Yemen were interrupted at the end of June, with an arrangement to stop negotiating  during the end of Ramadan and the  subsequent feasts until July 15th. The delegations  of  Houthi/Ansar Allah and Moutamar/Saleh returned to Sana´a and  the Hadi government party to Ryadh for further discussions. The briefing at the UN-Security Council furnished no progress, small wonder since it is the UNSR 2216 which remains the obstacle for a peace solution. It is now expected on the part of the UNO and interested countries that the fractions will agree to a roadmap during this period. A sub-committee monitoring the ceasefire has been convening in Dharan in Saudi Arabia. The Peace Pact is vehemently urged to be concluded in Saudi Arabia but this is rejected by both the Houthi/Ansar Allah and the Moutamar/Saleh fractions. Saudi Arabia´s primary goal is “to keep face and safeguard the country´s honour“, i.e. to end the war neither as looser nor as culprit.

The acts of war are far from being terminated, though, while hostilities continue at three fronts but with increasingly fewer foreign troops. Soldiers and  the “People’s militia“ of Houthi/Saleh fight on one side, primarily Yemeni mercenaries on the other. The mercenaries are, above all, tribal peoples paid and equipped by Saudi Arabia. Focus of the armed disputes is the desert province alJauf, adjoining Saudi Arabia east of Saada, and the area around Nihm, ca 30 km east of Sana´a. This mountainous area represents a gateway to Sana´a and has been a centre of hostilities since the beginning of the war. The third war theatre remains Taizz, where radical Sunni militia, entrenched in the town, fight the Houthi/ Saleh circumvallation. No major areal gains are to be expected on either front.

Only the areas held by Houthi-Saleh militia are governed by Yemeni forces, the South and the East of the country are increasingly ruled by foreigners, with Qatar all of a sudden substantially participating and looking for Yemeni stooges, in addition to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, in charge since the commencement of hostilities. The Qatari Emir Tamim recently met with Ali Mohsen alAhmar, who, from his exile in Ryadh, is  counselling the Saudi troops in attacking Yemen, and has been nominated by Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi as his vice president in a surprise coup this April. As mentioned before, Ali Mohsen had originally been an intimate friend of Ali Abdullah Saleh´s who made him an immensely rich man, but joined the opposition at the 2011 revolution and had to flee the Houthis and lives in exile in Ryadh. He is now considered a protagonist of the Muslim Brothers and, consequently, disavowed by the Emirates. Before Ali Mohsen Emir Tamim had already invited Hussein Mohamed alArab, Hadi´s minister of the interior and also a former party member of Saleh´s, to join him for an information encounter. If the Qataris start considering Ali Mohsen and alArab as their stakeholders in the Yemeni theatre this implies that the tensions and competitions within the GCC escalate and will be redeployed into Yemen.

Convincing proof of the Emirate´s adopted hegemony in the South and their rejection of Hadi´s government since the humiliating dismissal of Khaled Bahah is  the recently  raised complaint by Ahmed bin Daghr, the newly appointed premier minister, also one of Saleh´s backed out protégés. In May, Bin Daghr arrived with a small sized cabinet in Aden to demonstrate the presence of the government and to ” set about reconstruction“. Since then the supply situation has become worse than ever before and even now during Ramadan power and gasoline are a rare occasion. Many Adanis would go hungry without the religious welfare institutions and international aid supplies. Bin Daghr publicly complained that he and his ministers had been offered three rooms only in the government palace upon arrival and that he and his colleagues together have but these three rooms to sleep, live and work in. To aggravate the situation the Emirati occupation forces do not provide for security officers so that they cannot move around in Aden but in actual fact live miserably and cannot govern.

Bin Daghr´s cry for help fully reveals the situation of “President” Hadi, who for by now 15 months no longer had a leg to stand on in Yemen, is unwelcome all over the country but claims in the peace negotiation to return as a winner after the Houthis have deposited all arms and quit the field.

Many of the Hadi-friendly international observers should have noticed by now that it was a mistake to grant him exclusive support – which he refers to at whatever occasion – and to consider him as the suitable man to consolidate Yemen.

The political status quo in Yemen is much too complex to permit a simple solution. The long standing distress of the population has brought about local conflicts, above all in the South. In Aden it is rumoured that opponents in alDhale´s provincial government are also responsible for the shortage of water and power. The climate between alDhale und the neighbouring provinces of Lahij und Abyan but also Aden had, ever and again, been poisoned for historical reasons. AlDhale´s political forces have been acting ever more hostilely since the beginning of the war and have created a militia of their own.

The situation in the Northern provinces under Houthi rule is relatively stable. Civil rights are limited owing to the present siege and blockade but the Houthi government appears to enjoy quite some backing under their revolutionary council. In particular in Sana´a the atmosphere is quiet and peaceful, with sporadic spells of power after a year of total darkness.

The Sana´ani population is waiting for “lailat alqadr” (the night in which the Koran was revealed) and prepare for “aid alfitr” (the feast of breaking the Ramadan fast), the feast at the end of Ramadan on July 6th, when new dresses, festive meals and sweets for the children should be given. It is hoped that the “Zakat”, the tax requested and expected to be  delivered by the believers in kind at the end of Ramadan, will help also poor families and war victims to celebrate.

Yemen remains closed to personal traffic, with no civilian air transport to and from  Sana´a and Aden.

Distribution of food ratios during Ramadan by one of the numerous aid organisations active in Yemen

Fitr-Feast at the end of Ramadan: New dresses and lots of sweets