The political scene in Yemen ever and again offers a political coup. Only a few days before the announced commencement of the ceasefire and the start of negotiations of the Yemeni conflict parties in Kuwait on April 18^th President Hadi dismissed Khaled Bahah, his deputy and at the same time minister president, and replaced him by Ali Mohsen alAhmar (vice president) and Ahmed Obeid Bin Daghr (minister president). Khaled Bahah had been humiliated by abuses heaped on him but was nevertheless appointed “Counsellor of the President”. Bahah had initially stomached the dismissal stating  “he would serve Yemen in another way“, but one day later pointed out that the dismissal lacked legitimacy and undermined efforts towards concluding an internal Yemeni peace agreement and, furthermore, offered a justification for the coup d´état on the part of the Houthis.

As regards actual proceedings speculations vary considerably: For external observers it is hardly comprehensible that

• the wrangling among always the same old holders of power will take place completely divorced from the war crimes suffered by the population and the consequences of siege, expulsion, shortage of food and medical care, and no work nor income of a majority of people.

• the legitimacy of such decisions does not meet with misgivings in Yemen. Apart from the dubiousness of Hadi’s legitimacy as president who resigned in January 2015 and whose period of office expired in February 2015, the question remains if it is legitimate to govern a country exclusively from abroad?

Hadi himself has at the most spent two months of the past 12 months of war in Yemen, Ali Mohsen alAhmar and Ahmed Bin Daghr appointed by him as representatives have been in exile in Ryadh for more than a year and are not wanted back home.

• Hadi’s procedure must by all means be challenged since it is primarily targeted at derailing the projected negotiations –  unless other alliances of convenience are entered into before …

Yemeni observers speculate above all in respect of the shift in power relations and the ensuing consequences for the individual parties. Even in the analyses of journalists priority is very rarely given to the interests of the population. What would Hadi’s “diplomatic stroke“ bring about, in particular since it is not obvious whether he acted on his own free will or fulfilled an order received from Saudi Arabia? After a month of direct negotiations between Houthis and Saudis, from which he is excluded, he must have realised that his days as president are numbered and that he can only set the course for the time afterwards.

In his first appeal to the Yemeni population Ali Mohsen alAhmar therefore statesmanlike addressed the common issues: “There is so much to do for us, to save our homeland, to come to terms with the past and create a transition to the future, to protect and maintain the rights of all Yemenites”. And then continued referring to a “Victory over the rebels”. Since Ali Mohsen had to flee head over heels when the Houthis entered Sana’a, acts of revenge are no doubt to be expected.

Both Ali Mohsen alAhmar and Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr are considered “Traitors” since they repeatedly changed their apparent loyalties. However, such treason is considered somewhat normal in a system of expediency of alliances.

The empowerment of Ali Mohsen al Ahmar indicates, in a first step, a return to the authoritarian power relations before the revolution and before the National Dialogue and its democratic structures and meets Saudi Arabia’s vision to tolerate only authoritarian systems. During the past months Ali Mohsen had been the closest adviser of the Saudi army in attacks on Yemen – above all of the ground troops. Despite very little military success he gained the confidence of the Saudis during this engagement. However, being a Muslim Brother, he is strongly disliked by the Emiratis now governing the Aden area. His appointment aggravates the competition battle between Saudis and Emiratis in Yemen, the more so since Khaled Bahah had been promoted by the Emiratis to become Hadi’s successor.

It is, furthermore, evidence of a re-evaluation of the army as traditional governing power, while the armed forces had become numerous fragmented militias in the course of the past year. Ali Mohsens meets with overwhelming rejection in the political scene in Yemen. He is supported only by the Islah-Party, profiting from an upgrade with the appointment of the conservative hardliner of the Muslim Brotherhood after a substantial loss of importance since 2011. He is also favoured by Yemenis who are grateful that he contributed to Ali Abdulah Saleh’s fall by – speculatively – supporting the revolution. He might also be backed by  alQaida having been the „hatchet man“ during Saleh’s ruling and maintaining excellent contacts to the former alQaida. The population considers him as not trustworthy, primarily in the South where he accumulated a wealth of latifundia and real estate after the 1994 civil war. In the South the separatists regain strength after Al Mohsen’s  promotion.

A definite opponent of Ali Mohsen alAhmar is above all Saleh himself who feels betrayed since 2011 and has declared him as well as Hadi as traitors of the country. In the light of decades long relations between the two protagonists who jointly suppressed the Yemenis and plundered the country, some observers expect that Saleh and alAhmar might well come to a new arrangement.

But alAhmar is also opposed by the Houthis against whom he led bloody but unsuccessful battles in the six civil wars from 2004-10 as Saleh’s commander. The Houthis regard alAhmar’s appointment above all as an unjustified evaluation of the Islah-Party, against which they massively fight – in particular in Taizz.

Albeit, the Houthis visibly refrained from commenting this shake-up corresponding to a coup. They dispose in Khaled Bahah of a conciliatory compromise candidate for heading a unity government. It would appear that direct negotiations with the Saudis have priority for them and they keep calm.

Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr’s appointment is most notably a blow against  Saleh who immediately reacted by expelling  bin Daghr and Hadi from Moutamar, his Congress Party. Ahmed bin Daghr had been one of the closest  proxies of Ali Abdullah Saleh and had enormously profited from this connexion. He and other top politicians of Moutamar had been „turned around“ under the guidance of Hadi some months ago in Ryadh and coined  to represent a „Counter Moutamar”. Saleh has every reason to fear that bin Daghr will represent Moutamar at the negotiations in Kuwait and at the subsequent formation of the government and he would be ousted.

The abruptly organised shake-up of the government results in various shockwaves and in a new composition of the different positions for the negotiations in Kuwait. This affects Ali Abdullah Saleh most and serves Islah –  but might change very quickly indeed. It will not bring about an alleviation of the war burdens for the Yemeni population in a foreseeable future.

The negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis appear to be stumbling along because of the recurrent interruptions of the ceasefire:  the Saudis bombard the provinces of Saada and Taizz, the Houthis have, once again, fired a rocket to Saudi Arabia. At least an exchange of prisoners took place twice and the discussions are continued – both parties are under pressure to finish the military war. The Houthis refrained from commenting Hadi’s shake-up but only announced that their delegation in Kuwait will be chaired by Ali Ahmed al Dhafif. Adel alJubeir, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated that the Saudi-Houthi negotiations proceed successfully  –  as did Crown prince Mohamed bin Salman the week before. Al Jubeir confirmed furthermore that no representative Saleh’s is involved in the negotiations.

“Hadi’s Government”  in the meantime dispatched Abdullah al Alimi, the director of the  presidential office with a delegation to Kuwait.

The military situation in Yemen has remained relatively unchanged for the past weeks. Houthi-Saleh-forces are present in the provinces more or less representing the former North Yemen, with the exception of Marib, where war rages. And in the provinces of alBeidha, Schabwah und alDhale Houthi dominance slightly exceeds the frontiers of Yemen before the unification.

Sana´a and the Northern provinces are almost daily bombarded by Saudi allied forces and Taizz remains under violent unrest and fiercely fought over but relief supplies could in the meantime be delivered to the besieged population. In the capital city Sana´a and the provinces of Dhamar, Ibb, Rhaima, Hodeida and Manacha the situation is relatively calm and is under Houthi control, although both Sana´a and extended further areas have been without electricity for months and the economy is stagnating. The ministries and offices are operational in Sana´a with a major share of the staff appointed under Saleh still at work. The Houthis have exerted little influence in this respect while dominating military and security affairs. Most of the schools and universities have recommenced, many among them in emergency shelters and ruins since numerous school buildings were damaged or destroyed.

The numbers of civil casualties and injured persons, of famine stricken and displaced citizens do not stop increasing and the entire western part of Yemen is threatened by an alarming shortage, in particular children suffer from malnourishment and illnesses.

In Hodeidah the port is buzzing with incoming relief supplies and commercial goods. A short time ago Saudi Arabia requested a departure of all vessels with a view to exercises envisaged at sea with allied Sunni countries to be carried out in the port areas. This was quite obviously recognized by the ruling Houthi-Saleh fraction as a pretext to occupy the port.

The situation in South Yemen is truly ambiguous. It remains inexplicable which targets are pursued by whom.

The provinces of Hadramaut and Mahra, covering approximately half of  the entire Yemeni territory, had so far not been involved in the war between Saudi Arabia and  the  Houthi-Saleh forces, nor had Hadi´s so-called legitimate government been represented. Almost the entire region is under alQaida control upon consent with parts of the local authorities. The provinces of Marib and alJauf remain heavily contested areas with advances and retreats on both sides.

Although Hadi recently announced in Riyadh that “ Yemen has been freed to 85%“ the exiled government having re-entered the country in no way controls  Schabwah, alDhale, Lahij und Abyan, and not even the “provisional” capital Aden.

The situation in Aden turns more unbearable every day – less secure and more chaotic. On March 5^th a hit squad in a new UAE funded Yemeni police vehicle raided an old people´s home administrated by the Congregation of Mother Theresa. Four armed offenders stormed the hospice, captivated and killed 14 persons, among them foreign nuns, assistants and geriatric resident patients. The offenders escaped unrecognized.  This “the offenders escaped unrecognized“ has brought the Adani people to the verge of despair. Violent crimes have become a daily occurrence, with in most cases officers of the security police being shot at from passing motorbikes but a Salafist clergy and a judge have also been victims.  Car bombs explode on the market, bomb attacks destroy police stations.

The murderous attack on the hospice met with furious protects by the Adani population, all over Yemen and by the international community. AlQaida and Daash hastily dissociated themselves from the attack in the social media. Many questions of the Adani population remain unanswered:

Who is interested to sow chaos und violence in Aden if not alQaida und Daash? Why is the government incapable of arresting the offenders? Why  is it not possible to  provide for security? Why is the project of recruiting the resistance fighters for a public security force obstructed? Does this destabilisation aim at a prevention or a promotion of the Secession of the South? What is the intention of the occupying forces – in the first instance the Emirates?

The dissociation on the part of alQaida and Daash gave fresh impetus to new rumours intensified by the Hadi fraction and Islah that the former president Saleh launches such subversive activities because he wishes to prevent any stabilisation of Hadi´s government in the South. However, such rumours  strengthen in the first instance Saleh himself, conveying the image of a big wheel and commander of an armada of violent criminals, thus reactivating the anguish of South Yemenis having experienced more than 20 years of anxiety under the terror spreading government.

In this way and by means of recent TV addresses Saleh succeeded in strengthening his position once again and dampened the restorative return of the revolutionary ambitions for freedom and democracy of the Yemeni population yet again. One further former power broker is returning to join the power play in Yemen:

Ali Mohsen alAhmar, while in exile in Riyadh, had been appointed by Hadi as his deputy, i.e. the deputy supreme commander of the armed forces. This alters the constellation of the former political manipulators and the old power merry go round starts turning again.

A short recapitulation:  Ali Mohsen alAhmar  (70) had been the closest confident of Ali Abdullah Saleh, remunerated by him with numerous sinecures, many thereof expropriated latifundia in South Yemen. Rivalry started when Saleh commenced around 2500 to groom his son Ahmed to become his successor. Saleh appointed alAhmar as (unlucky) commander of six wars against the Houthis. During the last of these wars in 2009  alAhmar’s headquarter had – by mistake? – been hit by Saudi aviation bombs, but alAhmar remained uninjured. When the revolution started in 2011 alAhmar joined the revolutionaries and requested that Saleh step down.  He had been chief commander of the so-called Fyrga, a very big armed unit in numbers and very loyal but much less educated and equipped than Saleh´s Republican Guard and his security headquarter. In addition, Ali Mohsen alAhmar is closely connected to a part of alQaida in Yemen. When the Houthis entered Sana´a on September 21st, 2014, he was utterly surprised by the co-operation of Saleh and the Houthis and had to flee to Riyadh into exile, where he allegedly gave advice to the Saudi army command in the air combat against the Houthis and during the invasion of the ground troops. The Saudis obviously overestimated the belligerent spirit of pro-Hadi fighters but also alAhmar so far failed to motivate strong tribes to join forces with the Saudis. Nevertheless, Ali Mohsen is personally interested in a public position of power in Yemen, not least because he wishes to reclaim his huge property not always legally acquired.

While the originally revolutionary conflict in Yemen increasingly rigidifies towards a power struggle the international stakeholders exert pressure towards a ceasefire through the UN – at the very least to avoid waves of refugees leaving Yemen. The UN-security council appears to have gained insight that Resolution 2216 had been counterproductive in respect of a ceasefire and peace negotiations since it favoured Saudi Arabia and conceded the country unrestricted bombing in Yemen. A new Resolution on humanitarian basis, immediately objected to by Saudi Arabia, is to initiate a path towards peace. This is not so good news for the Yemenis as the drafting of such a resolution was offered by Great Britain so far having massively supported the bomb war against Yemen.

Breaking News: 

After one week of secret preparatory discussions a Houthi delegation arrived in Saudi Arabia for negotiations. Simultaneously hostilities between the two parties at war were subdued. Neither the exiled government of president Hadi who is in Indonesia at the moment, nor ex-president Saleh or the Moutamar are represented. At the same time Massud Jazayiri, the Iranian brigadier general announced that Yemen will receive the same “advisory support” as the Syrian government had been given before. The negotiations are conducted by Mohamed Abdulsalam who already presided the Houthi delegations in Geneva I and II.

Mohamed Abdulsalam, dyed-in-the-wool politician and spokesman of the Houthis, is negotiating  a cease fire, frontier conflicts and peace conditions with and in Saudi Arabia

Renewed efforts towards a seize fire and peace negotiations

Latest reports keep referring to an imminent “Geneva III“. The pressure exerted by the “International community” on the warring parties in Yemen to end the fight soonest possible increases – probably also because of the steadily growing number of refugees. Rumours speak of an Omani-Russian peace proposal, and the UN and Ismail Ould Shayk Ahmed, the special envoy for Yemen, consider a restart of the negotiations that had been postponed several times since mid-January.

However, Saudi Arabia, the most powerful war participant will, once again  not attend the discussions and reserve the right to continue bombing Yemen unrestrictedly, so that negotiations in the current pattern look absurd from the Yemeni viewpoint.

President Hadi and his government, representing the interests of Saudi Arabia in Yemen – at least officially – dismiss all negotiations for as long as the Houthis and the Saleh-Fraction have not painstakingly fulfilled the UNSR-Resolution 2216. Pre-negotiations in respect of freeing of prisoners, lifting of blockades to permit supplying the population and territorial displacements up to a certain point appear to be secretly under way.

The pattern of power relations meanwhile keeps shifting in Yemen but not in any sustainable way

The continued travel diplomacy of prime minister Bahah appears to bear fruit in so far as a level of understanding between Saleh-Houthis and the Emirates looks promising. The connecting elements are the fight against alQaida and Daasch terrorism, and a certain affinity of the rulers of  Abu Dhabi und Dubai to the Saleh-Clan, plus the image of Islah as the common enemy, possibly also a showdown vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.

The recent massive tension between Houthis und Saleh, and also his pressing ahead against the Saudis may well be abating while a switch over has occurred between Hadi and Bahah.  Prime minister Khaled Bahah recently returned with several ministers to Aden after staying in the Emirates whereas President Hadi has changed again a number of government officials. The most important change concerns Ali alAhmadi, who retreated as head of security forces, and was instead appointed counsellor at the ministry of foreign affairs. Hadi, furthermore, appointed governors in the provinces of Hajja und Tihama, although both are under Houthi authority.  Bahah, so far considered as Houthi compatible, all of a sudden launched an inflammatory speech against the Houthis and proclaimed eulogies over the good deeds of the Saudis, creating astonishment among his followers.

Hadi continues losing respect of, and popularity with, the population since his declared goal to restore security in Aden did not materialize. The situation is getting ever less secure, on the contrary, political assassinations and attacks have become a daily programme, supplemented by serious criminal actions such as armed robbery. The so far latest politically motivated assault was committed by a so-called suicide bomber succeeding in having a dynamite-loaded vehicle explode in the immediate vicinity of the government palace on January 28 ^th. Daash, as usually, immediately confessed to this assault via social media. Such confessions are contested by many South Yemenis suspecting Saleh to be behind this sabotage. The resumptions were nourished and increased the general bewilderment when it transpired that the photo published by Daash of the alleged bomber was identical to the one of a Dutch Djihadist, reportedly killed in action in Syria in October 2014.

The very insecure situation in Aden could probably be explained to result from the intention of some war parties to prevent a unified Yemen. Primarily interested in this are Daash und alQaida, who could spread out untroubled by the Houthis in a South Yemen without security structures.

Many Yemenis are sarcastically amused by a photo published by the social media and showing goats nibbling at a Hadi poster. It reminds the Yemenis that, while they suffered Saudi air raids, occupation and terrible shortages  Hadi resided in one of the luxurious guest villas in Riyadh and asked the Saudis to expose his fellow countrymen to more hardship. When he returned from exile after seven months he had visibly gained weight.

Hadi´s  “order” of a bomb war against Yemen brought about an accusation of high treason of the exiled president and five of his government members by the Houthis. The proceedings against the accused were conducted in their absence by the judge Yahya alRubaid in Sana´a. On January 25^th a Saudi bomb destroyed the house of the judge, killing off him and almost all his family.

The accusations brought against Saudi Arabia`s conduct of war by the international NGO’s, as increasingly conducted against civilians and the economic infrastructure of the country, start gaining medial influence with the UN massively attacking Saudi Arabia for violating martial law. The US government and, in particular, Great Britain on the other hand, start being pressured. Saudi Arabia claims that British advisers are permanently present in the operations room to assist defining targets, while the British government attempts to keep at a distance and postulates that British experts exert no influence on the choice of targets. The potential of the infrastructure destroyed by the Saudi air force – using mainly in Britain produced bombs – increased on daily basis. A breakdown renders the following figures of damage suffered since mid-December 2015:

The number of military victims is assiduously not disclosed but an unconfirmed figure of 24.000 killed soldiers leaked out a short while ago. In the meantime, famine is spreading. According to NGO´s reports 14 mio Yemenis are malnourished.

The international situation and, consequently, the constellation of Yemen in the out-of-control Middle Eastern power structure keep constantly changing. The most important events affecting Yemen during the past weeks:

• the  sanctions against Iran were lifted, the position of the country has considerably improved, an international race for business deals with this financially well-established country with a huge pent-up demand for modern products has started.
• Saudi Arabia starts losing influence also in the Syria negotiations while Russia experiences an upward trend, this also as a result of military success.
• The news that Saudi Arabia, at least partly, straightforwardly  purchases the solidarity of 24 countries with which a coalition was announced (Sudan, Somalia, Malaysia), by no means improves the prestige of the country.
• To the amazement of the international press Foreign Secretary Kerry emphasized the undisturbed friendship and loyalty between Saudi Arabia and the USA.
• The visit of the Chinese president Xi Jinping in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran in addition to discussions of common interests in the energy and transport sectors, also included peace negotiations for Yemen.
• Turkey is heading towards a phase of destabilisation which might result in civil war in the East of the country.
• Russia interferes just like in Syria to an increasing extent in the agenda, as generally in the Middle East, and mostly in accordance with Iran.

The parties at war in Yemen have been negotiating for five days in a small village outside Biel to end the armed dispute and sign a peace agreement after nine months of conflict.

The negotiations should have started with a seven-day ceasefire. This truce was not only postponed for 12 hours but was also immediately broken. The three negotiating parties keep casting the blame for the breach of  the agreement onto each other and the media are dominated by war propaganda.

However, not all parties involved in the armed conflict are represented at the meeting. The negotiating participants are:

• eight delegates of the exiled government of Abdrubba Mansur Hadi, presided by the only recently sworn in foreign minister Abdelmalik alMiklafi, and four consultants;
• the second fraction consists of four delegates of the General People´s Congress (Moutamar), presided by Arif Azuka and representing the interest of ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and two consultants;
• the third fraction consists of four delegates of Houthis/Ansarallah, presided by the Houthi-spokesman Mohamed Abdul Salam, and also two consultants.

After numerous delays the negotiations between the Yemeni parties assembling in a remote village near Biel to come to terms to end the war on permanent basis finally commenced on December 15^th. 24 delegates represent three fractions of the conflict.

The negotiating teams – with the exception of the Houthis – mainly consist of political representatives having hold functions during the past decennium and having had a say in political events. In compliance with a UN request two women are among the 24 delegates.

Not represented are:

• Representatives from the South, in particular the proponents of a secession;
• Representatives of the armed resistance, combatting the advance of the Houthis but not accepting a re-instalment of Ex-president Hadi;
• Representatives of the Youth, substantially involved in the revolution in 2011 but marginalised by war events;
• Representatives of the Muslim Brothers and the Islah Party, pursued by the Houthis in the North and the Emirates in the South;
• Representatives of the Tribes, not supporting the Houthis but not willing to tolerate occupying forces on their territory;
• Representatives of the civilian population, above all women and children who suffer most under the war and blockades;

Not represented at the negotiations are the following parties heavily involved in the war in Yemen: the representatives of the so-called coalition, having bombarded the country since 26^th March, foremost Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the USA, Great Britain, Jordan, Morocco and Sudan, and also ground forces from the Emirates and Saudi Arabia with mercenaries from Sudan, Eritrea and mixed private armies, mainly consisting of South Americans, under orders of the Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The negotiations are chaired by Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed, the UN special envoy, tightly organising the negotiations. This includes the obligation on the part of the participants to maintain silence about the progress of the discussions and only authorise the discussion leader to issue a press release.

Although these regulations favour a „to be among themselves“  of the Yemeni parties the Gulf states intervene, as do the „international community“ and other interested parties, exerting a permanent and sustainable pressure on the negotiators.

The by far strongest pressure targets at terminating the war as quickly as possible to permit aid supplies to enter the country and meet the most urgent needs of the population – with the aim to prevent substantial numbers of refugees leaving the country. 170.000 Yemenis sought refuge   –  foremost in Africa so far. The international community would most welcome locking up the Yemenis until a peace agreement materialises, but this solution is jeopardised not only by internal conflicts and tensions in Yemen but also by interests on the part of the Gulf neighbours. In the course of the subjugation of Yemen by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, their respective interests and targets have diverged, in turn rendering Ex-president Hadi´s ruling in the South (who wanted to please both “patrons”)  ever more impossible.

The conflict between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia escalates because of the Islah party and the Muslim Brothers, regarded as Hadi´s supporters by Saudi Arabia while pursued as terrorists by the Emirates. The second centre of conflict are Ali Abdullah Saleh and his son Ahmed Ali Saleh, enjoying life undisturbed in the Emirates. Saudi Arabia considers the Salehs as traitors, and wishes to continue imposing sanctions on them and remove them from power in Yemen for good while the Emirates speculate for Ahmed Saleh to become a high ranking personality again.

And both the Emirates and Saudi Arabia opine differently as regards territorial goals in Yemen.

Two tasks, until now very important for the negotiations, could be accomplished at least in part, however.  First, an exchange of prisoners: 300 captivated Houthis were exchanged, by common accord, for 265 representatives of the „Sharia” (legitimacy) as referred to by Hadi´s fraction.  But the Houthis did not free the two most important hostages, defence minister Subeihi and Hadi´s brother Nasser, head of the secret services of Aden, Abyan and Lahij.

The second goal reached concerns a long chain of lorries, carrying aid supplies, eventually having entered Taizz after months of being cut off from the outside world.

This only came about after Hamud Mikhlafi, the Salafist resistance leader against the Houthis had left Taizz for Aden and was shown there on TV.

Next to impossible appears to be a solution of the claims to power. The military situation as shown on the map of Yemen on December 9^th:

The territorial situation somehow resembles the North-South frontiers as existing in 1990, but the provinces of Taizz, Ibb, Dale, alBeidha, Marib and alJauf are partly controlled by the Emirates and partly by Saudi Arabia while the Houthis , unchallenged, control large parts of the former North Yemen and – as not shown on this map – have extensively entered the Saudi provinces of Jizan, Asir and Najran. The troops of the coalition fight for a coastal strip at Bab alMandab and have not ceased attempting to take Taizz. Further targets are the oil fields in Marib und alJauf. Saudi Arabia is first and foremost keen to control oil and gas resources in Yemen whereas the Emirates look for zones of influence on the Red Sea and the South coast. According to present signals the “International Community” is in favour of a separation of the country, with the frontiers only slightly diverging from those in effect until 1990.

The discussions were interrupted on December 19^th. A working group was

formed to set up a mechanism for a cease fire by mid-January 2016.

Political Situation: North and South Yemen are progressively drifting apart

A few days ago, Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi, the exiled president, arrived by plane with several ministers in Aden – without any official reception as had already happened at his short visit in September.  Hadi had been outside the country for altogether eight months which certainly has led to a hardly bridgeable alienation. He immediately retired to the recently refurbished and hermetically barred government palace in Aden, from where he refers to the Houthis as “dogs in their caves whom we will annihilate” and wants to supervise the siege of Taizz by Sudanese and Eritrean mercenary troops, led by Hamoud alMikhlafi, the Salafist resistance hero of Taizz.

Minister President and Premier Minister Khaled Bahah, while ever more conflicting with President Hadi, meanwhile visited Soqotra, inspecting the damage caused by the Chapala and Megh cyclones, before departing to Abu Dhabi where has was welcomed with full military honours reserved for heads of state. In a recent interview he voiced a conciliatory opinion vis-à-vis the Houthis and shifted the enemy image to the proliferating terrorism of alQaida and Daash.

Daash admitted having caused the bloody attack on a military campus of the government on 20^th November at the section between Shibam in Handramaut and Marib near the diversion to Saudi Arabia. Insiders opine that this assault had not been instigated for military reasons but rather for the purpose of controlling the smuggler routes which lead from Mukalla to the South of Saudi Arabia.

Hadi or Bahah

Although Hadi is as much disliked in Aden as all over the country he still enjoys more popularity than Bahah who is suspected of some affinity with the Houthis, In Sana´a, however, where the situation is almost back to normal, Hadi has no backing whatsoever, is hated as has become obvious at a major demonstration on 21^st November, with thousands of participants rallying against Hadi, Saudi Arabia and the USA. The indignation was refuelled by news that Saudi Arabia is receiving from the United States twice the amount of bombs previously already dropped over Yemen. Hadi´s repeatedly declared “legitimacy” of asking for Saudi aggression against Yemen and the start of the war, is being questioned to an ever increasing extent: not only his election in 2012 in the absence of an opponent, but also his  resignation, followed by a resignation from his resignation, and, eventually, his claim to continue his presidency despite the expiration of his term of office on 15/02/2015, and his 8-month-exile in Ryadh in splendid luxury while the population in Yemen “went down to rack and ruin” at his instigation – convinced most Yemenis that Hadi is not an eligible candidate to bring about an end to chaos, misery and catastrophe in Yemen.

Sana´a, 21/11//2015: Demonstration against Hadi, Saudi Arabia and the USA ”supplying 20.000 further bombs to be dropped over Yemen“.

Geneva II negotiations delayed

The start of negotiations between the Yemeni adversaries – referred to as Geneva II –for the purpose of reaching a cessation of hostilities has been requested, announced, further delayed for weeks, giving rise to a growing speculation that the conflicting parties do not aspire a consensus. On the other hand it is rumoured that unofficial contacts are on-going.

While all outside interventionists, including the UN, the US, and Europe (motivated by dreading new agglomerations of refugees ) exert pressure to start negotiations without delay,   the conflicting parties hesitate. The crucial point appears to be that Hadi´s fraction (and with him renegates of Moutamar government party, Islah and further somewhat more restrained party representatives) insist on implementing UN resolution 2216, which would oblige the Houthis to admit defeat. In turn, the Houthis have presented a 7-point programme providing for a transition phase for a political cooperation of the conflicting parties, with absolute priority to be given to re-establishing  the country´s sovereignty. In actual fact the harshness of military disputes increases and each war party attempts to reach the best possible start position. The Houthies are gaining ground at present.  On the other hand the Saudi allied forces have been replenished with various units of mercenaries and the outcome of the battle for Taizz will decide the negotiating positions. This confirms speculations that the country might be divided into several regions and the discussion will focus on frontier lines.

Ismael Ouid Sheikh Ahmad, the – rather weak – UN delegate for Yemen had been in Ryadh a short time ago, is in Teheran at present and will go on to Qatar, Kuwait, and the Emirates, a clear sign that the  real conflict partners Saudi Arabia and Iran have more than a say in the development.

Exiled president Hadi´s fraction has already tabled a list of the delegates for the negotiations, consisting mainly of experienced party politicians of the toppled Saleh regime. The delegates represent the spectrum of “old parties” from the Salafist Rashad party to the economy-minded “Justice and reconstruction party”. The South is underrepresented as are the new associations formed during the revolution and the political dialogue. Meanwhile also Saleh, although no longer supported by a political power (while in exile his Moutamar party shifted to Hadi) but still engineering very strong military units, nominated five trusted persons for participation in the negotiations. The Houthis have so far not published a list of delegates but will no doubt send Mohamed Abdelsalam and Saleh alSamad as delegation leaders.  Houthi spokesman Abdelsalam reiterated recently that the Houthis are keenly interested to promote a peaceful agreement since the war only produces death and destruction. The Houthis will thus be the only participants squeezing new staff into old power cartels.

The fractions of the conflicting parties keep accusing each other of sabotaging the meeting and the negotiations in Geneva. It is said that the event will be postponed to December.

The military status quo

The war propaganda machinery on both sides renders factual information next to impossible.  War is going on at the following frontiers:

In Saudi Arabia fighting continues in the North of the Yemeni border in the provinces of Asir, Najran and Jizan, hushed up by the western press. Houthi-Affrash are involved in fighting Saudi border units having become reinforced by national guard troops. The Houthis have achieved impressive territory gains and destroyed numerous Saudi frontier towers, military installations and tanks and armoured vehicles. Saudi Arabia so far succeeded in keeping this hidden from the international press although the Houthi broadcasting station alMasira keeps issuing relevant photo material.

In Taizz and in the vicinity of the town obstinate fighting causes up to 50 dead persons daily on both sides. Houthi-Affash fight against resistant “Muqawama” under the leadership of Salafist and self-appointed Sheikh Hamoud alWikhlafi. His troops consist no longer of local resistance groups but ever more frequently of military Islah.

In the liberal town of Taizz the war has adopted a more sectarian character than elsewhere. Sudanese troops and possibly also “foreigners” such as Eritrean, Mauritanian and Columbian soldiers have also been sent from Aden to “liberate” Taizz. If and when they could be in a position to alter the situation in favour of Hadi is very dubious since it can hardly be assumed that the Taizz population will agree to be liberated by foreign occupation forces after months of horrendous deprivations. Both conflict parties have started to arm women and train them for battle.

UNHCR provides drinking water for the population in Taizz

Armed woman in Taizz.  Both war parties train women to fight

South of Taizz a front line runs from Bab alMandab in the West till Shabwah, with the air force base in alAnad 12 km to the North of Aden as the focus of fighting. If the news can be trusted the Houthis are advancing. In laMocha on the Red Sea they successfully assaulted from ambush stationary “liberation” troops supposed to secure the Bab alMandab.

The Emirati represent the most active “protective power” at the time being in Aden.  They have installed Patriot defence missiles in Marib and an outpost in Shabwah and could so far repel two Houthi-Affash missile attacks. Both in Marib and in the provinces of Abyan, Aden, Lahij and Taizz  the Houthis deploy anti-personnel mines causing considerable injuries and mutilation of non-military victims, above all children.

The frontline in Marib, inaugurated by the Saudis six months ago in order to put the screws on Sana´a from Northeast and Northwest, still runs at a distance of approx. 30 km to the West of Marib. The Saudi troops appear to have dropped the project of besieging Sana´a although low level fighting is being continued. It can be taken for granted that the Saudis will take hold of Marib, keen on controlling oil and gas production.

The situation in Aden and Sana´a

Life has almost come back to normal in Sana´a with considerable shortcomings in the infrastructure though: Electricity stopped more than three months ago. When gasoline could not be bought for weeks either many Sana´anis purchased cheap mini solar plants to reload mobiles and watch TV by means of emergency lights. Schools have reopened but there are no international flights to and from Sana´a yet. Ports and airports remain blocked. Despite a total embargo at the Red Sea ports gasoline has been available at service stations in Sana´a since 18^th November, raising the question of secret supplies or secret arrangements.

The Emirati troops in Aden were exchanged for stationary militia to guaranty the security of the returned Hadi government and keep alQaida and Daash at bay. In addition, more than 1,000 Sudanese and also Columbian and Mauritanian mercenaries have landed. The repeatedly announced and subsequently postponed recruitment of resistance fighters into the regular army and the security forces is said to take place as well.  Reconstruction in Aden is very cumbersome, particularly since some districts on the peninsular are heavily damaged. Many refugees have returned though and a process of normalization has commenced with the – partly provisional – revival of school and university activities. The Emirates are extensively present and offer selective assistance, spectacularly covered by the media. Regular flights abroad are promised to commence in a near future.