A report on the overall situation in Yemen cannot be offered at the time being, only on parts of the country in respect of the current political and/or military situation.

Hadramaut and Mahra: no ongoing war, alQaida increasingly gaining control of the security situation, the shore and economy and destroying historical Sufi-sanctuaries and holy tombs in line with Daash practices.

alJauf, Marib, alBeidha, Shabwa: hostilities between troops of the Saudi Allied Forces and mercenaries (tribal people and Yemenis trained and paid by the Allied Forces) and Houthi military organisations. The Saudi Allied Forces have established a base in Safer, Yemen´s energy centre, eagerly endeavouring to heckle Sana´a. Despite their impressive dominance in terms of material and staff no noteworthy progress could so far be achieved but serious losses suffered. Possible reasons therefor are lacking experience and poor motivation of the Saudi troops, divergencies in the command centre (repeated friendly fires), no local knowledge.

Saada, Aaran, Hajja, Sana´a, Sana´a environment, Dhamar, Hodeidah:

From the military point of view occupied by Houthi/Saleh with major counter rebellions of the population only in Hodeidah. Sana´a, Sana´a environment, and Saada are perpetually bombarded by Saudi air raids, the other provinces occasionally. Air raid terror has been going on for six months but very little acts of war on the ground. The population is extremely exasperated and angry with Saudi Arabia, increasingly supporting the Houthis. Since military targets have long been destroyed the air raids attack the infrastructure and civilian areas with the number of victims having soared to at least 2,000, with 500 children among them. No cease fire on Eid alAdha holiday (24^th September), the city of Sana´a has become ever more blocked. All bridges leading to the North, West and East were blown up so that supplies of fuel, gas, food and medicine can no longer reach Sana´a, now besieged as Aden before.

Taizz, Ibb: Intensive fighting between Houthis-Saleh militia and “Muqawama”, the local resistance associations. Taizz is extensively destroyed; ferocious, bloody fighting in the streets cause many victims, further aggravated by bombing on the part of the Saudi Allied Forces with many missed targets, destroyed hospitals, very little medical help for the wounded, and alternating “ruling” by the two war parties.

Aden, Lahij, Abyan; alDhale: Following the retreat of the Houthi/Affash militia important acts of war are experienced in alDhale at the border to Ibb only. In Aden the Emirates have taken over, with so far fairly low-key activities, distributing gifts and food for Eid alAdha, arranging dancing performances and attempting to create a pleasant atmosphere. The main streets are decorated with banners showing portraits of the Emirs of Dubai and Abu Dhabi and reading: ”Aden thanks the Emirates for the liberation and the donations”.

On 23^rd of September Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi landed with a Saudi aircraft in Aden. He was neither received by representatives for the Emirates nor by primeminister Khaled Bahah who has been in the city for weeks with a group of ministers and has made first attempts at a normalisation. The tensions between Bahah and Hadi can no longer be ignored.

Hadi delivered a festive address with torrents of hatred against the Houthi/Affash and servile thanks to the Saudi coalition. Ex-president Saleh offered a sharp contradiction on his TV channel alJaman aljaum, proclaiming in statesmanlike style national unity against the arch enemy Saudi Arabia. The entire conflict in Yemen, having by now encompassed the whole region, appeared all of a sudden reduced to the battle for power of the arch rivals Saleh and Hadi.

Hadi subsequently visited a power plant in Aden (which resulted in a total breakdown of the power grid) and injured patients at a hospital and also chaired a ministerial meeting, postulating the same items Bahah has been trying for weeks to implement: A Four-Point-Programme consisting of the following measures: care of the injured persons, compensation for the victims´ families, payment of the salaries withheld for three months, integration of Muqawama into the army and the start of reconstruction.

Hadi left Aden on 25^th September already to attend the UN plenary assembly and retrospectively issue a licence to the Saudi Allied forces for war crimes and violation of human rights committed. This unleashed a wave of indignation, not only in Yemen but by now in many other countries worldwide which – on the basis of the reports of human rights organizations – ask for a detailed investigation of all war crimes and human rights violation of both the Saudi allied forces and Houthi/Affash .

Hadi´s flying visit to Aden had clearly shown that he no longer meets with   support in Yemen and he only derives his claim from the UN resolutions and not from the Yemeni population. He is, furthermore, accused of having so far jeopardised all peace negotiations, having thus brought further misery to his country. The so-called “pro-Hadi” forces are not only in military terms but also politically a chimera.

Especially disliked is Riadh Yassin, whom Hadi only recently appointed foreign secretary, well known for his tirades of hatred and presumed to have prepared himself for further upgrading (Bahah´s position?) by means of poster campaigns of his own.

The precarious situation in Aden has not gained stability with the presence of the Emirates. The total power breakdown is aggravated by fuel shortage, no gas supplies and attacks – in addition to the arrival of alQaida.

Asir, Jizan, Najran: The three provinces in the Southwest of Saudi Arabia had been Yemeni for hundreds of years and are populated by Ismaili tribes. Hardly noted by the international press the Houthi/Affash keep steadily advancing into Saudi Arabia as “ National Yemeni Army” as they call themselves. With relatively simple equipment they destroy tanks and other military vehicles, have shot down apaches, blown up border watch towers and killed high ranking military officers. They have so far penetrated 80 m of Saudi territory. Since videos of the hostilities (including Saudi border forces taking flight in panic) are regularly shown in the Internet the invasion cannot be hushed up and gives rise to Schadenfreude of many a terror stricken Yemeni, very often neither a follower of the Houthis nor of Saleh …

The situation in Yemen is unclear and, at the time being, very confusing. Although it has become evident that, as regards the military tendency, the Houthis are pushed back from the occupied regions towards the North there is no central political authority and no administrative structure pointing the way ahead for the entire country or, at the very least, for larger areas. In the South the Houthis have been waging war above all against the “opposition” (muqawama), composed of different, often oppositional groupings most of which have no military standing: Haraka clusters having assembled during the revolution movement, moderate but also radical secessionists, more or less fundamentalist Shafi´i, and alQaida, the biggest armed opponent of the Houthis.

A characteristic feature of muqawama – originating in the people committees during the revolution – is their concern to pursue their goal of protecting the family, the home and the living quarter from Houthi attacks exclusively on local basis. Members of muqawama in general have no military training, have “poor” weapons and refuse to be motivated to enter into combat with Houthis outside their own catchment areas. Following the expulsion of Houthis they immediately took over the distribution of relief supplies to the starved and suffering population. This proved relatively successful in, for example, Aden although some consignments were still sold on the black market.

President Hadi issued a decree that the entire army and the security forces should be completely composed anew and restructured and that muqawama members are entitled to be recruited. This has been a very clever policy stroke since this decree ties muqawama to Hadi – which had so far not necessarily been the case – and offers those ready to be engaged a secure livelihood in the present extremely unsecure situation. However, this move will result in members of alQaida also joining the armed forces of the state.

Muqawama represents a rather urban phenomenon and is differently aligned in the individual towns. What unites them at the time being is their position as the only reliable police force, having taken over also the tasks of waste disposal, emergency repairs and social services. Schools remain closed, however, and hospitals can function insufficiently only because of damage and shortage.

This function on the part of muqawama is of particular importance at the time being since alQaida, upon having fought arm in arm with the opponents´groups, now wish to usurp the leading role and dominate. The speedy expulsion of the Houthis from Aden, alAnad airforce basis and the Southern provinces Abyan, alDhale and Lahij, and, subsequently, Taizz and Ibb was possible only with the assistance of alQaida and Saudi air strikes and Emirate ground troops equipped with vehicles and arms. The frontlines run at the height of Taizz and in the East in Marib. However, backlashes also occur. Houthis assemble in some places, build up an army again and recover lost territories. The situation is thus very volatile.

Following the successive move of the war zone to the North the different groups in the South drift apart – to the extent of armed conflicts among them. Simultaneously, local leaders start gaining influence at the expense of a missing central government.

Ex-president Hadi postulates – from Ryadh – that he will assert himself as strong leader with decrees and draconic strength vis-à-vis the Houthis and the entire Yemeni population. His Red Lines include the fulfilment of Resolution 2216 of the Security Council, indicating – in actual practice – the defeat and complete withdrawal of the Houthis. Moreover he insists on the federal division of Yemen into six regions, prematurely promulgated in February 2014 and provoking the conquest then initiated by the Houthis. Still excluded remains the question of the future in store for Sana´a.

While Nadia alSakkaf inter alia proposes to transfer the seat of the government for some years to Aden, Hadi insists on the quick retreat of the Houthis from Sana´a, where they have considerable backing and followers whereas Hadi is not very popular.

Many Sana´anis are extremely worried about the near future. If the Houthis will not leave the city voluntarily, the population will be exposed to further acts of violence, if not a bloody massacre and further misery.

The Saudi air strikes are continued on the one hand, the deployment of ground troops of the allied forces and, consequently, urban warfare is to be anticipated on the other. Hadi envisages the method already applied in Aden:

Total besiegement of the city of Sana´a, starving out the population, blocking electricity, water, gas, fuel and telecommunication. This will, as has happened in Aden, immensely afflict the suffering population and bring about a large enrichment for war profiteers on the black market.

As a preparatory measure for the besiegement air strikes of the allied forces have completely destroyed the harbour of Hodeidah to prevent ships from unloading. At a recent meeting with president alSisi in Cairo Hadi has asked for his assistance when blocking Red Sea harbours.

Although secret peace negotiations are under way under the patronage of Oman, and Algiers is said to participate too, it appears to be pretty obvious that neither Hadi nor his Saudi patrons wish to enter into such negotiations (as already happened in Geneva) before the entire western part of Yemen has not been razed to the ground.

It is somewhat intriguing that representatives of Moutamar (GPC) participate in such negotiations as stakeholders. Intriguing because Moutamar is not a political party in the usual context but an interface organisation of ex-president Saleh who, upon the withdrawal by stages of divers leading members, has become a shadow of himself. His little remaining influence is granted by those negotiating. Judging from the present situation the winners of war and crisis will be the Islah party, pulling the strings from Ryadh, and alQaida upon having succeeded taking roots in the population.

The turbulences experienced in internal conflicts in Yemen were further heated up in the course of the past weeks. Hardly any mitigation of the suffering of the civilian population could be achieved despite the relief shipments eventually having reached the country.

Saudi Arabia has so far not paid in the promised USD 245 m to cover first aid measures while, in addition, blocking the delivery of aid supplies under the pretence they might possibly contain weapons smuggled in by Iran for the Houthis, with the effect that the supplies are not only delayed but also deviated. Most of the aid supplies are sent for inspection to Djibouti where substantial quantities are secreted away to the black markets in Africa. All relief shipments for Yemen arrive via the red sea harbour of Hodeidah, controlled by the Houthis.

Around June 25^th, while the population sighed because there was neither gasoline for transport nor diesel for the water pumps, no power from diesel plants and, finally, the Internet was cut off for lack of energy, it transpired that sufficient fuel has been discharged daily for all Yemen since mid-June. The Houthis requisitioned all gasoline and diesel, primarily to cover their demand but also to start up a gigantic black market from which Saleh allegedly benefits too. One litre gasoline is sold at the black market at up to USD 7.50 (ordinary price 75 cent). Gasoline stations recorded violent rows when Houthis were preferentially served upon claiming to fight corruption.

The solidarity of the population rapidly disintegrates in times of extreme hardship.

No relief shipment has so far reached Aden but basic food is offered grossly overpriced on the black market (up to 400 %), visibly labelled as relief aid. The allied Saudi air force bombs trucks carrying relief supplies to Saada for the purpose of preventing all humanitarian relief for the Houthis.

The UN, and in particular Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed as official delegate ever and again announce a ceasefire before the end of Ramadan (18^th July). Terror and violence steady increases, however. The attacks of the allied Saudi air force have reached a new dimension and aim at a new target. Air strikes especially concentrated over Sana`a, Taizz and Aden. Besides the known targets – military installations and weapon arsenals – now also civilian plants are bombed. This includes the party headquarters of the Houthis/Ansar Allah and the Moutamar (General people´s Congress, the party of Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abdrubba Mansur Hadi), public institutions and the residences of important political representatives of the parties ( i.a. also the home of president Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi), and places where many civilians are likely to stay, such as markets and shopping centres.

On a single day, July 6^th, 176 people were killed and hundreds injured during the bombardments – and, for the first time – reports no longer differentiated between civilians (collateral damage) and the military. It can be assumed that this means that civilians affected will no longer be considered as unintentional collateral damage but have become targeted objects whose death no longer needs to be explained by ”inaccurate targeting”. By extending the bombardments to the civilian population Saudi Arabia has set the course for a further escalation towards civil war. Among those killed or injured on July 6^th were civilians, among them many children, at an animal market in Lahij in the South of the country, at a market in Hajja in the Northwest and dozens of people shopping for Iftar at a market in the city of Amran . The international Community, preoccupied with Grexit and atomic negotiations with Iran, has so far not taken note of the increasing violence the civilian population is exposed to in Yemen, still less seen a reason for inventions.

The attacks by the allied Saudi air force for the purpose of hitting the party infrastructures of the Houthis and the Moutamar succeeds the previous destruction of the party infrastructure of the Islah by the Houthis and is, in all probability, part of a strategy to permanently destroy the democratic institutions and structures of Yemen. When the Houthis marched into Sana´a and started their campaign to conquest the South their priority target was to eliminate the political adversary, above all the Islah party and the Salafists. They not only destroyed the local and provincial offices of the Islah with mortar shells and battle tanks but also abducted thousands of party leaders, destroying and devastating their private houses. The number of prisoners is estimated to read about 6.000, including besides representatives of Islah also deputies of other parties, of the military, of public institutions, and also critical journalists, reporters, bloggers and other persons criticising the Houthis. In a final step the Houthis threatened to pursue and punish everyone advocating Saudi affairs.

If the Allied Saudi air force destroys the party structures of the Houthis and of Saleh this will decisively contribute towards more or less eliminating the most important political parties – representing approx. 60 % of the population – and no democratic structure, no representation of the population will be available for the reconstruction of the state, permitting the conclusion that both the Houthis and Saleh and also the Saudi coalition aim at an authoritarian post war constellation in Yemen.

Only the Southern movement has so far been spared the reciprocal strategies but has remained divided by disagreement (most certainly with helping hands); also unaffected have been the Socialist Party and some smaller parties.

The political alliances of the war time enemies have started to break up, though, and differences between the conflicting sides Hadi/Saudi and Houthis/Saleh transpire.

This started when the Houthis deposed two military commanders from Saleh´s allotment and replaced them with their own staff. Not confirmed sources report that Saleh´s reaction was to withdraw 5.000 soldiers of the Republican guard from Aden. Saleh and the Houthis now go separate ways when negotiating with foreign discussion partners (Russia, Oman, Iran).

Moreover, Saleh is internationally damaged since his “intimate contacts” with alQaida (well known in Yemen since the 1990s) were published on international level by an alQaida whistle blower. Ammar Saleh, a nephew of Ali Abdullah Saleh and vice-president of the NSA, co-founded by the USA in Yemen, acted as liaison officer to the alQaida group loyal to Saleh, thus functioning as supervisor of the alQaida assassination attempt on the US Embassy in Sana´a in 2008.

And tension is rising also between the exiled president Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi and his patron Saudi Arabia. While Hadi for the second time at shortest intervals – but much too late – asked UN secretary general Ban ki-Moon for help for the Yemeni population, Saudi Arabia intensifies bombardments on daily basis. Hadi, in his exile, relies on his son Jamal and his head of office Ahmed Aswad bin Mubarak. Coarse friction is reported to have taken place lately between Jamal Hadi and the brother of Ahmed bin Mubarak, with the brother having finally moved to Jeddah. Primeminister Khaled Balah officially stands with Hadi but keeps a distance vis-à vis the Saudis.

The drifting apart of alliances, the erosion of structures and the impoverishment of the population warrant misgivings in respect of the future.   There is growing concern that Yemen as a uniform country, existing in the present constellation since 1990 only, will not be sustainable and a partition into at least two if not up to possibly four independent states will become a fact.

Latest developments in and around Yemen

Regional situation

The new alliances in the Middle East remain far from being stable and the fight for Yemen, i.e. the exploitation of the country´s inner conflicts by instrumentalizing the conflict parties serves the showdown of the adversaries.

Saudi Arabia for the first time ( after the rehearsal in Bahrain) tests her military power and attempts to use the air war against Yemen for uniting the Gulf countries and , at the same time, assuming military control. King Salman schemes to strengthen his alliance against Iran by including Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar and Egypt in order to replace his former coalition with the USA.

Iran endeavours to counteract this Gulf Alliance by incorporating Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and, to an increasing extent, also Oman. Iran also strives to neutralize Pakistan and – almost always – to de-escalate and avoid military intervention. Provocative steps are also taken, however, such as the despatch of cargo vessels with aid supplies refusing to submit to inspection by the supervisory bodies imposed by Saudi Arabia. Iran can rely on being backed by both Russia and China.

Iran does not stop pointing out that the “Brother Muslims” should co-operate and stick together and not permit being played off against one another by Israel.

Israel, on the other hand, is most interested in inflaming conflict between Arab powers and escalate discord. So far Israel and Saudi Arabia share the target of barring Iran from using nuclear power in one way or the other but, in the event of Saudi Arabia´s quest for nuclear power to catch up with Iran, Israel will turn from an ally into an enemy of the kingdom.

Endeavours to forestall a positive conclusion of the nuclear power negotiations with Iran are currently vigorously supported by France – all of sudden the Gulf countries´ pet – and Great Britain, as is also the military course of action against Yemen, the latter in the expectation of lucrative orders for new weapons to replace those used up (Saudi Arabia) and destroyed (Yemen).

The vague development of a new foreign policy of the USA in the Middle East appears to be particularly ambiguous with regard to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In the medium term a political rapprochement is to be expected between the USA and Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and their proxies plus Daach, al-Qaida and radical Salafists on the other. The battle lines have already been drawn in all war-struck countries of the Arab spring, at the time being most easily comprehensible in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia deploys all available means and measures to swart a liberalisation and democratic tendencies in the Middle East while the USA start having second thoughts about vested moral principles, trying to regain lost credibility. Democracy should no longer only be   sermonized while repressive governments are simultaneously supported for opportunistic reasons.

The anti-terror battle has absolute priority for the USA, with Iran being a by far more efficient partner than the Gulf countries. And the USA also profit from Saudi air attacks on Yemen to launch drones against alQaida fighters in the wake.

The change in positions and alliances opens a wide operational basis for Russia and China, with the Russian doctrine vis-à-vis the development in the Middle East essentially deviating from western, above all US politics (not a scrap of a uniform policy!).

The present development in Yemen should thus be considered in this environment of political tensions and the instability of the region.

The situation in Yemen  

The present situation in Yemen is “homemade”, in particular as regards Saleh´s coup and the Houthis´ overthrow of government on the one hand, but cannot be imagined without the intervention of the regional forces, on the other. The following factors characterise the present situation:

• The unsuccessful conference in Camp David when US president Obama met the – deputy – rulers of the Gulf countries and no agreement on a mutual assistance pact of the USA and the Gulf countries came about. “Crisis in Yemen”, the envisaged theme of discussion is still lacking an announcement of results. In the preliminary press conference Obama had asked for solutions for: “How we can build on the ceasefire that´s been established to restore a process for an inclusive, legitimate government inside of Yemen”.
• End of the ceasefire/bombing Yemen on May 18^th, immediately recommenced at even more intensity, raiding all towns, especially Sana´a.
• Pitifully insufficient supply of the Yemeni population with aid during the five-day ceasefire. Aid material did not reach those in need because of the Saudi port blockades and meticulous checking.
• Termination of the three-day conference in Ryadh on May 20^th, dominated by the GCC, with the exiled Yemeni government and about 150 representatives of Yemeni political parties with the exception of the Houthis and A.A. Saleh but Moutamar personalities participating.
• Iran keeps Saudi Arabia accusing of having caused the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen.
• Iran sent a cargo vessel with 2.500 tonnes aid material to Hodeidah, accompanied by two corvettes and insists that the consignment be checked exclusively by the UN in the port of Hodeidah. Saudi Arabia intends to blockade the Bab alMandab and wants checks to be carried out by Saudi officers in Djibuti.
• The most important detail of the final Document at the Ryadh conference: “The declaration called for deploying Arab forces in Yemeni cities as part of support to popular pro-government resistance fighters as well as a humanitarian relief intervention”. This implies that the sovereignty of the Yemeni state will not only be further undermined in the air and at sea but also on the ground – with the consent of the exiled government.
• Number of victims as at May 20^th according to UN since the start of the air raids on March 26^th : 2,200 killed (mostly civilians), more than 7,000 insured, most of them without medical care, 550,000 displaced persons ( all figures without Houthi victims since these are not known).
• May 21^st: announcement of an inclusive Yemeni conference on May 28^th in Geneva by UN Secretary General Ban ki-moon: The target of the conference is “to restore momentum towards a Yemeni-led political transition process”. He obliges all participants: “to act in good faith and without preconditions”.
• Foreign minister Ryad Yassin declined to attend the conference for the exiled government because of the short date and Abdelmalik alHouthi stipulated that the peace and partnership agreement dated September 21^st, 2014, be the starting point for the negotiations. In his latest communication Saleh had already tabled the suggestion for such a conference in Geneva!

All the big towns in western-Yemen are in a state of calamity:

Television channels in the Gulf countries have been reporting continuous deployments of their air squadrons since March 26^th, aiming at targets in Yemen, the way CNN had presented precision attacks on Iraq during the Gulf War. The media and the general Gulf public are carried away by the “blitzkrieg” of the “storm of determinedness” and give way to a feeling of victory. War reports on Syria show primarily the suffering population while sympathy with the Yemeni people, for weeks exposed to incessant air raids, has not been envisaged.

More than 1.500 launched missiles have in the meantime been registered, in no way hitting only military targets such as weapon arsenals or barracks. Schools, hospitals, public buildings, the three major airports, roads, bridges and the already weak infrastructure were hit. Almost one thousand human beings were killed and thousands wounded. All relief supplies were cut off concurrently.

All the big towns in western-Yemen are in a state of calamity: no medical care in the absence of medicines, acute shortage of food because dearly needed   imports do not reach the harbours and cargo cannot be unloaded. Still available food and gasoline must be paid at black market prices, electricity is often reduced to two hours per day and butane gas for cooking has almost disappeared, water is becoming alarmingly short. Daily life has become unbearable for the inhabitants, the heavy nightly bombarding renders sleep impossible. Cellars or rescue installations are generally unknown – with the exception of tunnel constructions ex-president Saleh had provided underground in Sana´a and Aden, but only for his personal protection, It is a perfect absurdity that qat keeps being supplied while so many children do not get food.

The situation is worst in Aden, still fiercely fought over by the Houthis allied with Saleh-loyal troops and the militia and government troops. Besides rockets released from the air the city is exposed to gunfire from the sea. Hand-to hand combat is raging in the streets in central parts of the city. Further battles are reported form Brega in the West of Aden where a huge refinery is located. Both the air strikes and the attacks of primarily Egyptian war ships are mostly directed at civilian targets. About two thirds of the population have left the city and take refuge in villages. There is reason to believe that the entire city of Aden the focus of the conflict is planned to be completely destroyed.

Similar destruction activities have recently also been reported from Taizz where the government palace is in ruins – allegedly because it housed a weapon depot. Eye witnesses confirm that the entire infrastructure was destroyed by rocket fire. As far as ascertainable the belligerent parties were members of the Republican Guard and the government-loyal 35^th Brigade.

Excluding the 2012 deposed president Saleh, the chief actor responsible for the failure of the political transition and the present disaster, must be a precondition for whatever cease fire talks and peace negotiations, to be started soonest possible. A new government with Saleh still in office would be a continuation of the Houthi regime he masterminded since 21^st September, 2014: hierarchical military structures, a dictatorship, massive repression of civil liberty, including freedom of opinion and the press, arbitrary arrests, house arrest or prison with no access to courts and flagrant disregard of legal provisions, brutal persecution of political opponents with military power, without any consideration of the population whatsoever.

President Abdrubbah Mansour Hadi, exiled in Saudi Arabia and obviously under massive pressure from his hosts, has asked for the bombarding to be continued, but declined a ground invasion. This is probably to be understood to indicate that Saudi Arabia did not succeed “buying” mercenaries for a ground invasion. With Egypt and Pakistan having refused to participate, a mission recently undertaken by defence minister Mohamed bin Salman to the sub-Saharan countries of Chad, Mauretania and Senegal to recruit mercenary contingents, had not been strikingly promising.

Hadi rejected a proposal tabled by Iran to discontinue war activities, submitted to the UN Security Council as a four-point programme: immediate cease fire and stop of all military activities of foreign powers, humanitarian aid, recommencement of a broad national dialogue and the setting up of a government in which all political powers participate.

The new vice-president and new/old prime minister Khaled Bahah, appointed by Hadi, in a public address emphasized keeping distance to the attitude of the Saudi Arabian host and postulated a more conciliatory approach than Hadi, as well as proposals for a return to negotiations. He did not insist on Riyadh as venue for such negotiations and, in a press conference, addressed all those involved in the conflict: his exile government would concentrate on organising humanitarian aid. He appealed to the army, mostly controlled by ex-president Saleh, to subordinate themselves to the legitimate government and requested the Houthis to stop marching to and into Aden.

Appeals to end the conflict and stop air raids have in the meantime been received worldwide: UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon has requested all parties, i.e. also the Houthi coalition headed by Saudi Arabia, to agree to a cease fire and a truce:” It is time to provide for life saving corridors and open a gateway to peace”. Russia´s initiative submitted to the Security Council for a cease fire to permit humanitarian actions came to nought because France and Great Britain rejected the petition. Furthermore, President Obama and the Chinese President Xi Jingping have appealed to king Salman bin Abdelaziz to stop bombarding Yemen.

Jamal Benomar resigned after having accompanied the negotiations between political parties in Yemen as UN delegate for four years, explaining this step by referring to the permanent sabotage of his endeavours on the part of ex-president Saleh and the always retarded and much too weak reaction of the Security Council to his alerting reports. Jamal Benomar had substantially lost credibility since the siege of the Houthis in Sana´a and is now also rejected by the Gulf countries. He is accused of not having vehemently renounced the government´s arrest and repudiated the Houthis´ military aggression. He will, in all probability, be replaced by the Mauretanian UN diplomat Ismael Ould Shaikh Ahmed who had already been active in Yemen from 2008 to 2012.

Moutamar (the General Peoplé´s Congress – Saleh´s party) starts showing dissolution tendencies though, after the southern fraction detached themselves, and other drifting Moutamar members have founded new parties. About 20 leading members are reported to have left the country with their families and followers, mostly to Gulf destinations. Among them is Sultan Barakani, secretary general of Moutamar, and, most recently, also Naji al Shayef, former chief sheikh of the Bakil tribe and a close confident of Saleh, who ridicules the idea of departing himself – as suggested in al Jazeera and alArabia – with the statement: ”The person witnessing my leaving the country, has as yet to be born”.

Saudi Arabia has pledged itself to offer the UN 274 million dollars for humanitarian actions in Yemen, this in response to an appeal for help by the United Nations, asking for precisely this sum (corresponding to 253 million euros) to permit supplying the more than 7.5 million Yemenis affected by the conflict with the immediately necessary. In the light of the damage caused this sum would appear to represent a drop in the bucket.

Once again Yemen is faced with extreme turmoil.

When mutinous troops of the central security and the national guard and Houthi militia had further advanced into the South and come dangerously close to Aden, the present seat of the government, the situation escalated. President Hadi escaped and was flown via Riadh to Sharm alSheikh to attend the summit of the Arab League, where Yemen and the military intervention of the Golf countries are the central topic.

Yemen has become a priority theme in international news, this also since the aggravated situation with rising oil prices entailed worldwide consequences. The conflict raging in Yemen is referred to as religious confrontation or proxy war for the power play between Saudi Arabia and Iran for predominance in the Middle East by numerous news agencies.

Hadi himself and representatives of Arab States tend to portray the conflict at the summit in such simple terms in order to – eventually – meet with more solidarity among Arab countries against Iran and create the basis for a joint military rapid deployment force. Mohamed bin Salman, the son of the ailing king and now the young Minister of Defence of Saudi Arabia, distinguishes himself as leading figure and Yemen contributes the venue for the first deployment of a pan-Arabic force.

The situation is much more complex, however: three parties fight for power in Yemen. The present drama is by no means a religious confrontation – as incorrectly postulated by some media, but a political and military struggle for power.

The key player is Ali Abdullah Saleh, deposed as president after the 2011 revolution, who in 30 years of absolute rule has established and maintained an efficient network with the army, the security forces, an elite having become wealthy, and the tribes. Although he had been granted immunity and could enjoy a splendid living with all his family with the 60 billion USD privately “generated” during his time in office, he never accepted having been forced to step down and makes every effort – above all by sabotaging the government of Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi, his vice-president and successor, to take over again and establish his son Ahmed Ali, the former commander of the Republican Guard, as president in a centralistic and authoritatively ruled Yemen. He fully realised that in the event of a continuation of the road map of the Golf countries for the political transition, i.e. the adoption of a new constitution stipulating democratic voting rights and corresponding registration of voters, he could no longer count on a regular electoral victory. He is backed only by a small minority who profited from his unjust enrichment at the expense of his people while investments in infrastructure and economy for the benefit of the entire population were criminally neglected.

During the last months, Saleh´s strategies to usurp power culminated because of the time schedule of the political transition, while he – as throughout his entire period of office – acted ruthlessly vis-à-vis the Yemeni population increasingly sinking into poverty and exposed to acts of sabotage, to be spelt out not only in the form of bloody attacks but also intentional shortage of power, automotive fuel, gas and other basic elements of supply, and further measures to destabilise the government of Addrubbah Mansur Hadi. He cleverly also used of his media imperium for his purposes, hammering the idea into the population´s heads that everything had been better before – under Saleh – and is much worse now under a weak government.

Two years ago, Saleh already hatched a plot to regain power by misusing the Houthis. Partners in this plot had, besides Houthi representatives, also been representatives of the UAE and of the former Saudi King Abdullah – and Iran had also been duly kept informed. The plot did not remain secret and finally resulted in UN-sanctions against Saleh and the Houthis (travel bans, blocked accounts). Outside the country Saleh´s son Ahmed Ali, Ambassador in the Emirates, had coordinated the plot and endeavoured to hide the billions of money at Dubai financial centre to avoid the freezing of accounts.

A telephone conversation between ex-president Saleh and a Houthi representative, published by AlJazeera a few weeks ago, in which the prevention of the designation of Ahmed bin Mubarak as head of government in November 2014 was discussed, offers the conclusion that Saleh pulled the strings in this political plot.

It still remains an enigma why the Houthis conspired in this plot. It should have been foreseeable that Saleh never intended to share power with the Houthis and would in the event of military successes, in turn causing alarm bells to ring in the Golf countries, send the Houthis to their doom, and become regarded as saver of the country and smoothly take over. The expulsion of the most important representatives of Islah, the destruction of their party structure and the hunt for president Hadi and his government, the dissolution of all governmental structures and the violation of laws resulted in a nightmare of destabilisation, chaos and violence within the past weeks and months. Two days prior to the first bombing of the pan-Arabic air force Ali Ahmed Saleh promptly appeared in person in Riadh, submitting this very plot: ex-president Saeh sends the Houthis to their doom, and in return Saudi Arabia arranges the lifting of sanctions for the Salehs and paves their way to power.

According to alArabia, however, he met with definite refusal by Mohamed bin Salman (35), the new minister of defence, who also is the closest confident of his father, king Salman. He referred to the Golf initiative and the legitimacy of the presidency of Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi. He also pointed out that the red line is the city of Aden and that the Golf countries would intervene as soon as this red line would be crossed – which happened not later than March 25th.^.

The Houthis have acquired a reputation of invincible warriors in the course of their march from Saada via Amran to Sana´a and further on in Eastern, Western and Southern directions. Many of these triumphal marches are pure camouflage but it is this very camouflage which explains the utter bewilderment of the population. In most cases – above all in Taizz and Aden – the Houthis did not march into these cities but had already been there. In the bigger towns barracks and weapon arsenals abound, deployed by the “special forces”, mostly former members of the central security (amn almarkazi) and the republican guard (harras aljumhori), and the soldiers of these units only obey the orders of Saleh, simulating the triumphal procession of the Houthis.

A determination of Who, When, How and Why in respect of the belligerent activities will prove almost impossible since it is not clear which armed groups with which designations carried out which activities. Both armed supporters of the Houthis ( i.e. troops loyal to Saleh) and organised tribal militia could be involved. Houthis are encountered in both civilian outfit and various military uniforms. Among the security forces are units assisting the Houthis to advance and others fighting for Hadi (although a minority). The majority of the elite forces obey Saleh´s orders but also change from military to civilian dress according to the occasion, thus giving rise to total confusion about the fighting aggregations. To complicate the situation, disinformation is ever more spreading and panic is launched by the media.

The tribal militia supporting president Hadi are, on principle, equipped with light weapons only, while Houthi and Saleh soldiers have heavy war gear, stemming partly from the army and partly supplied by Iran.

The “genuine” Houthi warrior can be recognized by his being very young, incessantly chewing qat and equipped with a Kalashnikov – and eager to defeat the “Daashi”.

The motives and targets of the Houthis are so very difficult to assess because they have changed so much over the past months.They also appear to act much less under Iranian influence at present than under Saleh´s instructions. In the beginning their overall goal had been to obtain more equality and justice from the state.

Since the determination of the new regional frontiers, in February 2014, it is obvious that they also aspire a territorial expansion of their catchment area and possession of a red sea port and the oil wells in Marib. After the merger with Saleh their alleged aim of combating corruption and alQaida has become as implausible as their slogan dating back to the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. Since the siege of Sana´a on 21^st September, 2014, they have obviously gone in for an authoritarian military rule all over Yemen.

Where they fail to achieve a territorial “handover” as in alBeidha and most recently in Taizz they definitely focus on military expansion, usually obtaining a peaceful surrender by claiming to attempt exterminating alQaida. A remarkable feature in this context is the fact that many Houthi militiamen consider all opponents – by now alQaida, the salafists, Islah and lately also president Hadi (but not Saleh and Moutamar) as “Daashi“. Daashi, derived from “Daash” is the abbreviation for Doula Islamia fi Sham, Islamic state in Sham, Middle East – in short IS.

The bombing raids of Saudi war planes have been frightening above all the Sana´ani population since 26^th March as numerous Houthi locations and the barracks and arsenals of the national guard and the central security are in the city or in close vicinity. Shelling Sana´a makes the inhabitants leave the city,   whereas supply shortages start affecting Aden: shops, banks, service stations and other utility installations have been closed for days, added to this are power cuts and armed conflicts in all parts of the city.

The further development will no longer be decided on national level but in a regional and international context. The Golf countries are interested in continuing their “relief actions” for Yemen, permitting them to test and consolidate the formation of their pan-Arabic militia in actual practice. Iran, Russia and China object to armed interventions; Russia and China recognize Hadi as legitimate president – as does the rest of the World.

The Houthis so far declined all attempts at entering into negotiations and want to fight to the last man. Saleh wants to negotiate but no one wants to do so with him while the UN and many observers postulate that the crisis can only be solved on the negotiating table. But who wants to negotiate with whom?