The turbulences experienced in internal conflicts in Yemen were further heated up in the course of the past weeks. Hardly any mitigation of the suffering of the civilian population could be achieved despite the relief shipments eventually having reached the country.
Saudi Arabia has so far not paid in the promised USD 245 m to cover first aid measures while, in addition, blocking the delivery of aid supplies under the pretence they might possibly contain weapons smuggled in by Iran for the Houthis, with the effect that the supplies are not only delayed but also deviated. Most of the aid supplies are sent for inspection to Djibouti where substantial quantities are secreted away to the black markets in Africa. All relief shipments for Yemen arrive via the red sea harbour of Hodeidah, controlled by the Houthis.
Around June 25th, while the population sighed because there was neither gasoline for transport nor diesel for the water pumps, no power from diesel plants and, finally, the Internet was cut off for lack of energy, it transpired that sufficient fuel has been discharged daily for all Yemen since mid-June. The Houthis requisitioned all gasoline and diesel, primarily to cover their demand but also to start up a gigantic black market from which Saleh allegedly benefits too. One litre gasoline is sold at the black market at up to USD 7.50 (ordinary price 75 cent). Gasoline stations recorded violent rows when Houthis were preferentially served upon claiming to fight corruption.
The solidarity of the population rapidly disintegrates in times of extreme hardship.
No relief shipment has so far reached Aden but basic food is offered grossly overpriced on the black market (up to 400 %), visibly labelled as relief aid. The allied Saudi air force bombs trucks carrying relief supplies to Saada for the purpose of preventing all humanitarian relief for the Houthis.
The UN, and in particular Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed as official delegate ever and again announce a ceasefire before the end of Ramadan (18th July). Terror and violence steady increases, however. The attacks of the allied Saudi air force have reached a new dimension and aim at a new target. Air strikes especially concentrated over Sana`a, Taizz and Aden. Besides the known targets – military installations and weapon arsenals – now also civilian plants are bombed. This includes the party headquarters of the Houthis/Ansar Allah and the Moutamar (General people´s Congress, the party of Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abdrubba Mansur Hadi), public institutions and the residences of important political representatives of the parties ( i.a. also the home of president Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi), and places where many civilians are likely to stay, such as markets and shopping centres.
On a single day, July 6th, 176 people were killed and hundreds injured during the bombardments – and, for the first time – reports no longer differentiated between civilians (collateral damage) and the military. It can be assumed that this means that civilians affected will no longer be considered as unintentional collateral damage but have become targeted objects whose death no longer needs to be explained by ”inaccurate targeting”. By extending the bombardments to the civilian population Saudi Arabia has set the course for a further escalation towards civil war. Among those killed or injured on July 6th were civilians, among them many children, at an animal market in Lahij in the South of the country, at a market in Hajja in the Northwest and dozens of people shopping for Iftar at a market in the city of Amran . The international Community, preoccupied with Grexit and atomic negotiations with Iran, has so far not taken note of the increasing violence the civilian population is exposed to in Yemen, still less seen a reason for inventions.
The attacks by the allied Saudi air force for the purpose of hitting the party infrastructures of the Houthis and the Moutamar succeeds the previous destruction of the party infrastructure of the Islah by the Houthis and is, in all probability, part of a strategy to permanently destroy the democratic institutions and structures of Yemen. When the Houthis marched into Sana´a and started their campaign to conquest the South their priority target was to eliminate the political adversary, above all the Islah party and the Salafists. They not only destroyed the local and provincial offices of the Islah with mortar shells and battle tanks but also abducted thousands of party leaders, destroying and devastating their private houses. The number of prisoners is estimated to read about 6.000, including besides representatives of Islah also deputies of other parties, of the military, of public institutions, and also critical journalists, reporters, bloggers and other persons criticising the Houthis. In a final step the Houthis threatened to pursue and punish everyone advocating Saudi affairs.
If the Allied Saudi air force destroys the party structures of the Houthis and of Saleh this will decisively contribute towards more or less eliminating the most important political parties – representing approx. 60 % of the population – and no democratic structure, no representation of the population will be available for the reconstruction of the state, permitting the conclusion that both the Houthis and Saleh and also the Saudi coalition aim at an authoritarian post war constellation in Yemen.
Only the Southern movement has so far been spared the reciprocal strategies but has remained divided by disagreement (most certainly with helping hands); also unaffected have been the Socialist Party and some smaller parties.
The political alliances of the war time enemies have started to break up, though, and differences between the conflicting sides Hadi/Saudi and Houthis/Saleh transpire.
This started when the Houthis deposed two military commanders from Saleh´s allotment and replaced them with their own staff. Not confirmed sources report that Saleh´s reaction was to withdraw 5.000 soldiers of the Republican guard from Aden. Saleh and the Houthis now go separate ways when negotiating with foreign discussion partners (Russia, Oman, Iran).
Moreover, Saleh is internationally damaged since his “intimate contacts” with alQaida (well known in Yemen since the 1990s) were published on international level by an alQaida whistle blower. Ammar Saleh, a nephew of Ali Abdullah Saleh and vice-president of the NSA, co-founded by the USA in Yemen, acted as liaison officer to the alQaida group loyal to Saleh, thus functioning as supervisor of the alQaida assassination attempt on the US Embassy in Sana´a in 2008.
And tension is rising also between the exiled president Abdrubbah Mansur Hadi and his patron Saudi Arabia. While Hadi for the second time at shortest intervals – but much too late – asked UN secretary general Ban ki-Moon for help for the Yemeni population, Saudi Arabia intensifies bombardments on daily basis. Hadi, in his exile, relies on his son Jamal and his head of office Ahmed Aswad bin Mubarak. Coarse friction is reported to have taken place lately between Jamal Hadi and the brother of Ahmed bin Mubarak, with the brother having finally moved to Jeddah. Primeminister Khaled Balah officially stands with Hadi but keeps a distance vis-à vis the Saudis.
The drifting apart of alliances, the erosion of structures and the impoverishment of the population warrant misgivings in respect of the future. There is growing concern that Yemen as a uniform country, existing in the present constellation since 1990 only, will not be sustainable and a partition into at least two if not up to possibly four independent states will become a fact.